10 BIGNODES OWNS 45% VOTE POWER - take a stand!

Hi there, first time I truly get myself involved [not a noob but not an expert please be tolerant lol]

Is there any ongoing thoughts here to limit all these big nodes to get too much vote power? They have around 40% and protocols are all proposing them… They are killing the decentralization full speed.

Is this something people are worrying about ? Look at this, if tomorrow someone propose something to limit their vote power, what are they gonna do ? Vote against their own interests ? No. You see the problem here ? They are already to big to make any proposal limiting their vote power. I think we need to make some noise about it like, very bad…

Centralization is a plague that is invading terra right now ! Do you realize that even if a proposal was made, these big guys represent around 45% of vote power, it means they will automatically vote against any proposal made against the power they own.

excuse the broken english, french girl here

SOLUTION ? Not many unfortunately…

  • concept of saturation suggested by 0xjrr but how ? again, they will vote against the proposal…
  • Protocols have the duty to remove these nodes pure and simple (aggressive yes but hey, what solution do we have left ?)
  • as a user, everyone should delegate smartly and not there to limit a bit their power.
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I think the underlying principle of your question is very important. But removing them from the top of the page doesn’t change anything, because the page has no top, is just sorted by a specific column. I think the default one is voting power, hence they show on top.
A better way is probably similar to cardano that has a concept of saturation. When a pool gets saturated, starts to receive less rewards. You could cap saturation at say 10% of voting power, this will ensure current pools don’t see it has a threat to their stake, since currently no pool is at this value.

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The saturation would be a great start indeed . Very worried tho there is so few people only who cares about it right now … @dokwon ?

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May take time to play out and for stakers to care. I watch how nodes vote. If against what I’d vote, I’ll redelagate to a node that does.

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PROBLEM IS : You act smartly, most dont… and I just realized that any proposal against this very issue will fail because of the very same issue that issue raises… those nodes will vote NO. They own 43% of vote power.

there is a PR for random validator sorting in Terra Station which can help decentralization Validator sorting uptime by AutismStaking · Pull Request #226 · terra-money/station · GitHub

Instead of penalizing saturated ones like others suggest, may be better to incentivize unsaturated ones?
For example, lower voting powered ones with full up-time to get higher rewards vs those saturated…? Im sure we can figure out whats fair…

This could make:

  • Delegators seeking higher rewards will be hunting for reliable Validators with lower Voting Powers?
  • With relatively similar voting powers distributed from the above idea, can be actively adjusted with a formula hence no fixed APR % needs to be attached to any validators…?

Just imho

One way would be to educate the holders and ecosystem. I observed several tweets about the problem and took the liberty to divide my holdings among several validators with only one being in the top 10. Basically taking a prudent good citizen approach

There has been a lot of discussion on this topic lately, and great ideas on how to improve the distribution of voting power across Validators.
Feedback from the following talk (as well as from a talk involving Flipside and ideas for creation of a Validator score from various data) has been passed on to TFL and improvements are, as far as I know, underway!

Terra Money Staking & Validator AMA:
[December 16th 2021]

Staking rewards are limited in availability, so in order to reward some validators, you’ll be penalizing the others… not saying I don’t agree, just that you can’t do one without the other, those that don’t get incentives will always feel penalized, and in this case rewards are not even due to inflation parameters, it’s based on network usage and therefore limited in availability.

What about automating the delegation when minting bLUNA? Right now there are only a handful of validators to choose from on the dropdown in Anchor, many of which have big shares of the voting power. This could get automated to spread out delegation and even out voting power, similar to what Marinade does with SOL (and I believe Stader with LUNA).

Wouldn’t solve the issue entirely but seems like it would certainly help.

I’d like to see a move towards quadratic voting. That would safeguard not only against validators but against manipulation by whales in general.

Here are some links

So, what is Quadratic Voting?

Quadratic voting allows you to not simply cast votes, but also to make them more representative of an investment in an issue. Voters can cast more than one vote for an issue, but each subsequent vote counts less.

This system is mathematically complex. Without technology, it is unrealistic for large-scale use. Further, quadratic voting was first theorised as a monetised voting system. In this system, ensuring that following votes were not the same weight as the initial vote was paramount. But, by employing blockchain, this system could be both free and secured against ‘double spending’ votes.

Now, blockchain opens the possibility of a system with:

  • Some security against fraud, although we will not get into that fully here.
  • A way to distribute voting tokens to the population without the risk of them being transferred to other voters.
  • Due to the quadratic nature of this system, the additional votes cannot outweigh the vote of the basic population.

This allows electors to not only vote for what impacts them most, but also to express the intensity of their preferences. While these benefits will impact all voters, it is particularly important to safeguard minorities and mitigate polarisation in the long term.

Why ‘Quadratic’?

In Quadratic Voting, each participant is given a number of credits that can be used to vote for an issue. However, the cost of casting more than one vote for an issue is quadratic, not linear. So, the marginal cost of each additional vote is far higher than of the previous vote.

As a start Validators should be prevented from voting on their own proposals. @TerraBites has made a proposal to pay itself a community grant of $400k. As soon as voting opened, it voted yes.

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What about huge validators become multiple smaller? It is like being a BTC whale without whale wallet but 1000+ smaller wallets.