OK - great re. voting power. That makes it pretty robust in the short term.
And yes, slashing for oracle outages is a good idea in principle. But it will depend on how oracles get paid, as I know there was a discussion going on about whether oracles being paid from swap fees would create weird incentives to manipulate the Luna price (and it probably would). If it shifts to transaction fees then my concern would be that some would opt-out of running oracles until the fees increase. Of course, you could make it compulsory for all validators to run oracles but not sure if that’s what you intended.
I know there was also concerns that paying the rewards out of seignorage would also create weird incentives to cause more Luna to be burnt (On oracle reliability). This argument isn’t that convincing to me. Validators might be able to increase burn rate temporarily but system should be working against this - looking to mint more Luna to maintain peg. So the attack seems unsustainable. And therefore maybe this is something that we can continue to explore.
So I guess the key point is that slashing makes sense but only if validators can see the business case for investing in this area. Higher risk needs higher rewards.
Another option is to pay for running oracles by providing extra delegations. Then you probably don’t want slashing (as it would be Terraform funds that get slashed!). But you could review the performance of each validator, say once a quarter, and remove the delegation from any validator that is not performing or where there are signs of possible market manipulation. Maybe this can be built into the macroeconomic dashboard / analysis reports i.e. a report on the uptime of oracles + their deviations from consensus.