[Prop 1691] Terra v2.2: A Fair 11-point Confidence Restoration Plan for the Terra Enterprise

They are separate. Terra v1 treasury is also not taken by Terra v2. They will start over in that service product. Technically TFL owes no one anything in Terra v2. We wanted TFL team to focus on Terra v1, but the owners of TFL denied the Terra v1 governance to function when they stopped staking. Terra v2 will have its own new governance and structure. Terra v2 does not remove the debt liabilities from Terra v1.

Terraform labs (TFL) wallets is removed, not Luna Foundation Guard (LFG) wallets

1 Like

Constructive Support

Transfer of Control Concept

The transfer of control concept simply requests that TFL transfers the control of Terra v1 to a new community organization

@aeuser999:
While we disagree with some of the points you have outlined, we will not point out the issues as they would distract your central point. It is unlikely that any new proposals will pass any measures without the staking enabled because the minimum quorum required is >147.6M votes. You would need commercial interests to push for this.

The split to Terra v2 does not create a market. It is akin to Cathie Woods giving a mea culpa that ARKK ETF underperformed because it was bought during the tail end of the Fed QE injection then performing a hard sell across media outlets for rebuilding a new ARKN ETF during the beginning of a bear market. One does not fix the other and both can drop simultaneously. Ms. Woods is a gambler. We do not like gambling.

We invite you to our 1 Terra Community group on Telegram to discuss both the management and technical topics necessary to restore and rebuild rather than reboot. We believe it is a necessary step to restore confidence but also the restitution program and debt restructuring will be a community agreement independently of the restitution owed by TFL to UST customers and LUNA investors for being sold a failed stablecoin algorithm.

The change of control of the Terra v1 or its derivatives shall not encompass owning TFL’s actual liabilities. The restitution program is meant for the community to acknowledge that for DeFi to succeed the UST must be made whole so that the community can prove that DeFi can, does, and must be the way of the future. We thank Do Known and TFL for leading the project up to here, but now it is time to transition the project to more experienced hands.

3 Likes

Lock up periods are worth exploring. It’s similar to short-circuit breakers on stock exchanges.

2 Likes

Deconstructive Support (Recommendation: NO)

Algo-Stablecoin 2.0 Concept

The algo-stablecoin 2.0 concept wants to restart the Robinhood minting process covered with a basket of assets without any new external funding

@Deathstar_Daddy:
The fundamental flaw of the proposal is the failure to comprehend that algo-stable is flawed and that new investments to provide multiple assets are not coming.

2 Likes

Deconstructive Support (Recommendation: NO)

Cancel the Debt Concept

The cancel the debt concept seeks to eliminate all debt without compensating UST customers when starting over

@Shiradi:
The LUNA exists to keep the UST pegged to the dollar so that UST customers can freely use it without concerning about the asset side fluctuations. By canceling the UST is to admit that DeFi never worked.

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I’m fine with collateralizing UST there’s 313 btc left

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My response to yours about both our plans;

First I’m glad to see you taking the time to detail LUNAv1 so there is no confussion about which coin you are addressing. I have seen other plans that did not and it makes it harder to take them seruously (I use LUNAC = LUNA Classic).

However are you planning on Forking UST? I ask as you use USTv1 & USTv2, and there is no plans currently to fork it.

Regarding the Algorythmic system I think we are pretty much saying the same thing just saying it differently. I HAVE no plans on restarting the current system and have specifically expressed that. I even go on to say if a fix cannot be done it will be shelved.

We both seem to understand the value of this symbiotic relationship between the two coins, and agree that if done right it can work very well.

We both discuss the importance of having controls (Gatekeepers) in place to prevent another attack, and prevent any dillution. Again I go into detail about this.

We also both have plans regarding opening up voting to the (currently 6.5 Trillion) holders of LUNAv1.

We also both agree reducing rewards to Validators makes sense and helps build stability to the project.

My issues are that your plan seems to be built more of if the Forking plan fails. It also addresses debts, bankruptcy, and funds for USTv1 holders. It supports that the current company TFL will continue in its role to continue leading LUNAv1 & UST including Do Kwon himself unless he remains persistant of wrecking more lives???

Sadly the Forking plan looks like it’s a done deal. But with a plan in place that could be a good thing.

Why I say that.

  1. The New Coin will take care of hopefully all the debts of Old UST holders. According to my plan if the new coin is even somewhat successful they may even profit.

  2. So that means we can work on helping LUNAv1 holder’s. That said in the event that old UST holders are not full, I support a fund to do so 100%. They didnt buy a Token with risk in mind, they bought a stablecoin for the protection of $1 always being $1.

  3. Debts. What debts do you expect there to be? Most financing was collateralized wheras the lenders recieved Tokens in exchange for funds.

  4. Bankruptcy. Who will be filing bankruptcy? TFL? The only way that will happen is if UST and old LUNA investers are not made whole, in which case there will be lawsuits. And even then it’s not likley but is possible. For this reason it is important to separate and form a new Company. This protects the future of LUNAv1 & UST.

Now the real threat here is all the legal battles that can lead to actual charges to Do Kwon and TFL. That could destroy not only TFL, but any and all coins associated with it. They will drop to 0. This would undue any and all work we have done with these plans we are presenting.

Do Kwon needs to be removed from any leadership role on LUNAv1 coin and by extension TFL. I believe him to be an asset and maintaining some form of presence, however he has ALREADY destroyed enough lives to warrant his removal.

The reasons I listed above are why we NEED to be a separatly run company outside the TFL umbrella.

Overall it’s a good plan. Some key issues are not being addressed, and as I said it has many similarities to my plan.
My repsones to yours regarding my plan, and yours

You seem to be concerned with the speed of my plan?

First I said time is of the essence, but to put a stable plan in place, one that will turn this around and address ALL the deficiencies and issues regarding version 1 ecosystem. That plan needs to be approved when the forking event occurs. This is to help keep LUNAv1 & Ust listed.

However rushing to fix without doing any due dillegence is reckless and dangerous. The simple solutions can be done in haste but the more complex ones like the algorithmic issue for example needs time.

I like a lot this proposal. I recommend create a light version of this proposal to do more easy to read and other complete version.

1 Like

Sit tight. In review. A new revision is coming that spells out a strategy that should not conflict with the overall community’s sentiment, and comes armed with a nuclear weapon. Need to consult Do Kwon and JumpTrading first because they may want to take this up without having it disclosed publicly.

2 Likes

@Deathstar_Daddy:

The mods disabled editing so the contingency plan was written as a comment to clarify that upon when Prop 1623 is passed, that all references to USTv2 would become USTv1.1. There will not be, and cannot be, a LUNAv1.1. It is LUNA, UST, and one or more bonded UST to a dollar stable. The community does not accept forking so under no plan is there forking. Prop 1691 has no forking in the title.

The fix cannot be done period. There is no if so you may revise your proposal to make this a statement. We need to move forward with stable backed assets. The value of the stables is based on its country’s GDP and reserves. It holds value even if crypto or mirror assets are not used to back it. The least leverage occurs when Bitcoin assets drop in value simultaneously to UST depegging. Both trend towards worthless assets compared to the dollar.

For voting, we proposed that in the first round that all 6.5T LUNA investors get to vote, and after, that all UST customers also have the option to convert to votes by converting to LUNAs and a bond. This conversion price must be reasonable and 3/10 LUNA investors and 7/10 UST split served that purpose at the time. We were able to identify all sources of USTs for our new proposal where we will adjust to a fixed 2:1 UST:LUNA stakeholder ownership to stop the price oracle hemorrhaging which is still running even with the Minting Module disabled.

The communities that we have reached out to were resistant upon the reality that TerraForm Labs would not be shut down. We have the same understand that TerraForm Labs ceasing operations would cause a death knell to the enterprise. We also understand with today’s (5/23) news that JumpTrading was also involved with a deal with Do Kwon to front-run trades that the scope of legal threats could increase, and that the South Korean Metropolitan police calling on international companies to freeze LFG’s assets brings additional political and legal pressures that being associated to either TFL or LFG are not a possibility for the well being of the project. The project with branding rights must be licensed by TFL to continue anything related to Terra. Do Kwon may serve as a technical advisor to the community out of personal responsibility to help the new transfer of control to start unencumbered. We do not believe leadership can be by you alone. This must be hard to digest for you. It is a reality. Someone needs to have the technical know-how and technical leadership to move the new organization. We have seen many communities discuss different options but very few are capable of actually moving execution. The current leadership required is all-hands on deck. It cannot consist of some leadership operating at 25% capacity while devs work at 100%. It must be everyone working at 150% overcapacity until this project is revived and everyone must also understand both technical, finance, and have a network of peers in the same space to do so. We really appreciate your efforts to offer to take leadership, but right now is not the time for you to shine because what the community needs is someone different. Perhaps you may help in other ways.

If the community wants, they can hold an election for 7-12 non-profit board members to best represent them with a 1-2 year term and a 10-25% voting power of the governance steering committee, and the ability for the community to reject any and all members of the board by a vote of no confidence, followed by a special election. Ultimately if the board decides the communities request is illegal or if there’s no illegality but a stalemate, then the entity that the board represents must be dissolved. This is the only way to guarantee representation where it is not taken over by hostile actors.

We do not agree to reduce rewards to validators. It is not the purpose of Terra v1 community to punish validators for the algorithmic failures. In fact, we want validators to thrive. Even though we recommended the initial genesis of the new governance to consist of 100% of the LUNAv1 and UST stakeholders, immediately after this, we are calling for a vote with full representation, to determine how to and how much to motivate the builders the right way. The process must be performed the right way. The current Terra v2 was developed the wrong way, but TFL has every right to ignore the steering committee because technically it is a different service product and nobody is entitled to any airdrops. This does not mean TFL is still in technical default unable to service debt of the UST holders in Terra v1. They still owe this and the litigations that will come could grow more than Do Kwon and team can handle.

Certainly Do Kwon and team made multiple errors. They could be covering things up or any other conspiracy theories. Until a formal investigation is completed we best not speculate. We can only anticipate, plan, and act on them with the community’s blessing when the time comes but not before. Right now the focus is saving the community. Let us assume in this context that Do Kwon made errors for which he was unable to forsee and he was a victim of his own success. All these issues must be set aside to move forward in discussions and working with Do Kwon and team. We are not unreasonable people even during extraordinary times. Removing Do Kwon is the board of directors’ discretion where the community has no input. Instead for transferring control, let us not pursue kicking Do Kwon out, but to help him help us to save parts of his legacy to the DeFi space. He and his team have certainly poured enough of their life into Terra v1 that we thank them for that. Now the community deserves more senior leaderships to help guide the way forward while Do Kwon and team focus on being default alive with their Terra v2 product, and to survive the massive legal troubles coming their way. Let us also establish good relations with Do Kwon such that when the time comes that we have to change of control, that we have his blessing to carry forward what he wanted the community to experience before all this went down hill. That is the part of the dream everyone still wants. Though Do Kwon may have ignited the dream, the dream has evolved greater than him, and he should be proud of what he has achieved. Through governance we shall vote to provide some equity for his top developers. That is not an unreasonable request. What is unreasonable is not having a say during technical default.

The LUNA and UST can still continue. There is no urgency to rush because of any fear of de-listing. The urgency is on fixing the price oracle without changing its code by converting USTs from debt to LUNA assets and using restitution bonds to make whole someday. This is why we are saying solving the real issue requires technical leadership at this time. Your promises come without any substance is the crux of the issue. It is not a popularity contest but a bid to take on the most unenvious job on the planet right now with a ton of debt and hope to right it working 18 hours a day for the next 2-5 years with nearly no pay. If you feel you have other qualities to help then please vote for your candidacy as a community elected representative of the Terra v1 board of directors. The mission of the board is to service to the benefit of Terra’s community.

6 Likes

Constructive Support

CEX Burn Concept

The CEX burn concept requests that users sign-up to trade on a central exchange supporting all exchanges fees earned towards LUNA burn
(MEXC x LUNA Recovery Plan: Vote to Decide LUNA Burn by Utilising LUNA Trading Fees on MEXC)

@tianxuanjia01:
Please reach out to more CEX to enable burns.

3 Likes

First, thank you for the detailed response and info.

The Algorythmic system is in my opinion worth investigating to see if it can be done. Its a beautiful symbiotic relationship between LUNA<>UST, that if working smoothly, is like perpetual motion machine funding the ecosystem. There is a reason Do Kwon wanted this and now others like Justin Sun and the Tron team have also moved ahead with their own algorithmic stable coin, USDD. Again I have no plans on starting a system that will fail and won’t hesitate shelving it

I believe with the right safeguards in place it can work. I mean it does work and work well, it failed not because of the system design but external forces. The unlimited minting should NOT have happend. There should have been a cap on the system that when minting hits x within y amount of time, then the system pauses. System alerts are sent to the team to investigate and decide the next steps.

Also my plan accounts for multiple stablecoin’s UST backed by crypto including stablecoins, then one backed by USD and possibly a third one to precious metals, but thats longer term.

Regarding Leadership. Im not interested in doing this solo. I need a leadership team which I would be a part of. Maybe I need to tweek my wording. One person cannot lead and rebuild this entire ship on their own, not even the best dev in the world. There is a lot of work to be done. Regardless of plan adopted, whomever is leading the dev side of the team, needs to hyper focus there. They can’t be bothered having to deal with talking to the CEX’s regarding listing requirements, dealing with ALL the other issues, day to day operations, financing, not to mention damage control that needs to be done to bring back investor confidence.regarding a leadership needing to be a developer I don’t agree withcthat. I understand why you believe that, and respect your opinion on this matter. I believe a leader needs to have at least a basic knowledge of blockchain, and the ecosystem they are planning on coleading, and be able to grow and expand with the company moving forward.

Working long hours for little pay is something I already have experience doing lol.

Regarding legal battles. I believe that many in the community will hesitate to take legal action. There are many outside the community that either sold already or don’t act within the best interests of the community who already have the pitch forks raised. That said thaf would be containable hence why I said that legal action by holders will not push TFL into bankruptcy.

As you just mentioned what I was going to mention about the current events leading to the request to freeze LFG and TFL assets is troubling and puts us in a spot. It is for this reason we need to separate LUNA(C) & UST from TFL & LFG. I already expressed a desire to continue working with Do Kwon even in a partnership of sorts. Do Kwon put his heart n soul into this ecosystem so deep down I believe he wants it to flourish.

Regarding the Validators. 20 percent in my view was high. However in a stable ecosystem it may be feasible and that would be fine. But until we stabilize i feel that there will need to be a reduction.

Honestly at the end of the day we need a solid plan with a team backing it up. Whether its my plan or your plan or some other plan. I hope we can all work together on this as we both are passionate and want this to succeed.

1 Like

Amazeballz. May not agree every idea 100% still taking it in and will reread. Yeah a new summed up revised proposal be nice. Love this TYPE of thinking on course where how do we go from here adressing issues and offerring solutions.

Ja much better option than asking people throw personal LUNA funds into a scrificial fire.

@Deathstar_Daddy Appreciate and agree with a fair amount of your input. I however voted no in regards to you as el capitan. However, wouldn’t mind necessarily if you ended up with a government role… historically on Terra chain that is LUNA staked (difficult at the moment). But really, sub forums or alternate forum sites I think could be made by valditadors, users, individuals. The dApps tend to already have such since they have their own governance tokenomics. Nothing stoppi g you from making a LUNA voting block of some kind :wink:

Thank you to all those who are trying to suggest ways to restore confidence in LUNA and UST. @ERG @FatMan @Nikola-HydraChain @Deathstar_Daddy @aeuser999 and many others.

The situation is not easy, forces are fraying and there are many proposals on the table. I think it is time to make the decision making process more efficient and give all members of the community a voice and move forward quickly by consensus. There is still a chance for renewal, but with each passing week it is dwindling.

The decision-making process

It is time for the community to use the 7 decision-making process steps.

  1. Identify the decision
  2. Gather relevant information bogged down by too much information and that might only complicate the process.
  3. Identify the alternatives
  4. Weigh the evidence
  5. Choose among alternatives
  6. Take action
  7. Review your decision

Emails, Telegram, Twitter, this forum - all of them present a disparate mosaic of opinions that is difficult to navigate and does not lead to a goal. Everyone is trying to push their point of view, but the community is not finding consensus.

I propose to create the decision-making process using the tools available. For example, Loomio or the Open Decision Framework.

The key should be to break down decision-making into coherent areas for the community to vote on, moving through the process from substantive proposals to more detailed ones. In the beginning, this could be, for example:

  1. Leave LUNA and UST as is and create LUNA v2
  2. Burn LUNA and restore confidence in LUNA and UST

If the community decides on item 2, develop more proposals for that item and then vote on those. And so it can go on and on.

Everyone must be given the chance to vote.

3 Likes

Hi @ERG ,

Thank you for your kind review of Proposal 1597. I do agree that there are areas that we may see things a little differently - for instance:

  • whether the algorithmic stablecoin can work - I believe the issue of why there was a run on UST, from a supply / demand economics standpoint, was mainly the mint/burn hardcode limit issue and a lack of catastrophic level of reserve issue beyond the working reserve of LUNA market cap [ie. the diluting of LUNA in minting in order to buy UST and then burn it to bring the value of UST up and rebalance the two pools - and vice versa if UST is too high]. I am not opposed to a centralized stablecoin that may use a more traditional hard currency reserve, however, - and do feel that hard currency is a more solid and foundational type of monetary policy.
    • Sidebar thought: A side effect thought is that a centralized stablecoin will centralize the Terra project even further, since lets be honest, once you have a limited number of validators for a fast blockchain (which Terra has), then an investigative unit can cut off the head, just as they did with Napster]. Add in Anchor (which at minimum appears to be a broker, if not actually skirting international banking and money transmission laws), and MIR (which has its own securities issues), and it appears you are actually even more centralized. On the centralized vs. decentralized issue, I am for protections against criminal activity (including, but not limited to, types of trafficking and mob rule), but I do think governments step beyond their authority from time to time, and they do sometimes force citizens into systems that can be counter productive financially - even though in all fairness, they are suppose to be doing it for the good of the nation as a whole, and to serve it citizens, when they stay within the law themselves, particularly historic natural law).
  • the view of debt from a legal standpoint (although I really appreciate that you are concerned for actual people and recovery of funds, and the moral debt, - one of the things that has been very concerning to me is that many of those who lost funds were actually in Anchor, which was advertised as a sort of savings) (and I freely admit that I have not looked into this area as far as I should before making statements - so my thinking may be short sighted and have holes in it).
    • The legal status of the community is a non-personhood trust with a trustee (although they call it a trust, since it has non-personhood status, it would operate similar to a traditional association with a trustee). This type of legal arrangement gives all the authority in many respects, at least legally [from US law, but I have not yet looked into the laws of Singapore or South Korea], to the trustee(s), since they are enacting things in their own names, but it also places all the legal responsibility on them as well (which is kind of harsh, but that is how they set it up)(although presumably their actions have to be on behalf of the beneficiary, ie. the governance community, and presumably in accordance with the trust documents).
  • The fork (or restart) - I am not sure that both the original and restart projects will work if the restart removes the funds (which as I look at it, I can not see how they will not - unless they have significant new venture capital, which seems pretty difficult for them to have lined up this quickly given what just happened - but sometimes truth can be stranger than fiction, so maybe). Technically, according to their trust agreement, it would require a community vote to move the community funds [which probably does not refer to the Foundation funds - since it is most likely a separate legal entity] (but with staking / voting locked to only those who are currently staking LUNA - the vote may look very similar to Proposal 1623’s vote). I also wonder to what degree Terra would turn over the original chain (without legal action), even if they do remove the TerraForm Labs wallet address from whitelisting. If the restart happens, then, when I look at it from their point of view, the original ecosystem is the lifeboat.
  • I am concerned with whether or not the Anchor protocol would be considered legal without any legal licensing, and the SEC has questioned the MIR protocol (even though I think the SEC is outside of their jurisdiction, since TerraForm Labs is operating outside the U.S., I am sure they will continue to use the long arm of nexus to reach right into Singapore - however, Singapore or South Korea may act under prior treaty or agreement to cooperate with the U.S. in an investigation that is consistent with a treaty).

That said, I really appreciate that you have put a lot of thoughtful content in proposal 1691 - it is a very thoughtful proposal, and has given me a lot of food for thought.

I think if I were to characterize Proposal 1597, I would high light it as

  • fix the mint/burn mechanism and
  • make the reserve catastrophic proof (110 - 150% reserve for UST where none of the underlying reserve assets are UST itself), and
  • provides a lightweight framework to implement the proposal if TerraForm Labs does not feel the Proposal 1597 is inline with its vision.

At this point, it will take a miracle of God, in Jesus, for Proposal 1597 to pass, given that the staking mechanism is currently locked (and affects the ability to vote for those not already delegated to a staking pool). I agree that it would take validators for it to pass, and as I emailed each one, and am thankful their consideration, and was encouraged by those that took the time to respond back, it is clear that it has not gathered the support needed at this point.

I do think Stakin gave a valuable response that I was not able to implement, but I pass it along incase it is helpful for your proposal. Their representative mentioned:

Feel free to join our [Stakin] discord to debate about these proposals with other members of the community

http://discord.stakin.com/
In addition, I am not sure what the policy is to communicate on Terra’s Discord channel for validators, but a short, respectful, and non-spam, related communication may allow for discussion of a proposal on the official Terra Discord channel?:

Again, I really thank you for your kind words, and for your thoughtful proposal :slight_smile:

2 Likes

@ERG ,

On the above comment, the Stakin quote was suppose to end after the web address http://discord.stakin.com/ , the rest starting with “In addition, I am…” were my own thoughts. Just wanted to correct my comment (although it is not allowing me to edit it, so just posting the correction here).

I hope you are having a great day today :slight_smile:

@tente77: We strongly disagree on burning the TFL and LFG’s USTs. We’re reaching out to TFL’s investment team for a separate plan. It is too sensitive for public display. Will share only when the management and partners ignore. We developed a 100MT thermonuclear option that should only be used when all the other parts of the system are in-place and ready. The execs will come to know this is called Operation Raining Bulls. All we ask is for the community to have some patience. Burn all the LUNAs you want. Leave the USTs.

2 Likes