Validators only get their voting power from what delegators don’t use.
We, the TC community of delegators, must stay strong and united and all actively participate in governance for us to see a Terra Station Classic revival and stable future.
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It’s important that delegators also are not just in this to make money… We all have to remember the better the system - the more profitable it’ll be! Vote and vote wisely…
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Great point! This information should be appended to the Governance Tutorial as part of the official Terra documentation.
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Thanks for whitelisting these proposals so our truly decentralised governance can play its part.
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I was one of those thinking it would normalize but doesn’t look like it:
10% would force a Nakamoto Coefficient >=7
5% would force a Nakamoto Coefficient >=14
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Excellent, I like your comments and suggestions and I fully support them 
I like it, 10% sounds good 
This option, though good, still leaves the chain open to indirect governance attacks.
The fact that the top validators are aligned to our cause and make passing proposals effortless does not mean the chain is free from governance attacks or can maintain (as is) its democratic ways of governance in the future. It is our duty to make sure the voting power is distributed to as many validators as possible (a.k.a increase the Nakamoto Coefficient) so that if bad governance practices were to creep in there is a way to defend against them via the voting mechanisms in place.
In the state we are at the moment it is very easy for a single 20% voting power validator to launch an indirect governance attack and get enough power (34%) to single-handedly halt the chain (intentionally or due to technical reasons) or block proposals they feel are not suitable to their interests by Veto. Could they do that with fewer voting power limits? Yes, but would require A LOT more effort to achieve!
As a Case Study: Consider the scenario where a voting power (and therefore staking rewards) “rich” validator can stake their rewards on other validators gaining via those means over and above their 20% voting limit and veto influence.
I hope this helps 
In my opinion, 5% is an excellent number to maintain concept of the decentralization . We all aspire to a ecosystem built on decentralization, and I also suggest that validators be obligated to set at least 1% tax on steak rewords to be burned from the supply of Luna Classic.
thank you for all who support this wonderful community
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Voted no on both, not all validators are created equal, 5% maximum gives no advantage imho, 10% maybe at most. Seems 5% will pass anyway ofc.
Validators could be all standardized fee capped at 10% and no ability to run 0%
(Provides a level playing field)
B5 = 2% for Burn or other
O5 = 2% for Operating costs
N5 = 2% for New projects pool
D5 = 2% for Devs
S5 = 2% for Staking pool
Max validation 10% - over 10% to Max 20%
B5 continues = 2% for Burn or other
O5 redirects to S5 = 2% for Operating costs redirects to Staking Pool
N5 continues = 2% for New projects pool
D5 redirects to B5 = 2% for Devs redirects to Burn
S5 continues = 2% for Staking pool
Validator voting could be maxed at 5% and with an algorithm to allocate voting across the whole spectrum of validators that are operational.
A better Voting system so is transparent to the community and more engaging would be helpful.
Would also be helpful if we can see what we have voted on and for how much.
Need a better way to remove the junk proposals or highlight them as junk to the community, especially for people trying to understand everything who do not live and breath crypto.
Koch said it best:
"Validators only get their voting power from what delegators don’t use.
We, the TC community of delegators, must stay strong and united and all actively participate in governance for us to see a Terra Station Classic revival and stable future"
Can we implement something like a quadratic rewards system. For example with 130 validators, avg. voting power per validator is 0.77%. Those that staked with validators with >0.77% vp will get lower rewards (difference burned or send to treasury) while users who stake with validator <0.77% vp will get the full reward. Also, the higher the validator’s voting power, the lower the rewards for stakers. This should deter users from staking with validator with the highest voting power.
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Here is a thought experiment:
Pretend that it is possible (it very well might be) to tag wallets with a unique ID guaranteed to be both private & unique to a single human; that is to say: no human could have more than one of these IDs on chain, but could tag any number of wallets desired with a single ID.
Then we limit voting to only staked wallets with an ID, and cap the voting % by individual (by ID).
This would not affect the ability to earn rewards by staking for any wallet that doesnt have an ID tag.
It would only require an ID to vote.
In the case where an ID falls under cap restriction, the ID-tagged wallets could designate if they want their wallet to be included for voting or excluded under the cap. Then individuals could decide which validators their vote would count toward if the validator is casting the vote For them by nature of which wallets stake with which validator.
If this was implemented what would be the cons?
Note: we could never solve for collusion…not that I can tell.
CA
It comes down to delegators actively voting and being well informed! The better the passed proposals - the more valuable the system…
We don’t really want to give all equal share of the voting power as @Alesi_S said not all validators are equal. The whole idea is to spark competition amongst them so the ones with the best uptime, better performance, and engagement with the community prevail.
At the same time, we shouldn’t turn a blind eye when it takes 5 validators to control the whole chain by owning +66% of the power. To succeed in true decentralization and autonomy we need to address the worst-case scenarios, however unfeasible might seem, as if they were real threats (that oversight was TFLs and DKs’ ultimate failure)
In practice, whatever the cap is set to the top validators will still acquire their rightful spot. This proposal ensures the maximum amount of validators that can have the max cap is AT MOST 7 or 14 depending on the 10% or 5% cap set respectively.
[P.S. Food for thought with another worst-case scenario (which I know some devs are trying to address), and is slightly unrelated to this proposal: What if TR went rogue?
The moral of the story: The chain must live on and flourish even if we dont…]
Not really far-fetched for some rouge insiders, especially planted in TR. How do you think short sellers like Gigantic Rebirth get their insider information? Put a 8M short bet right before DK’s arrest warrant, and quotes a cryptic “Lock Her Up” HC? Just search on Hindenburg and NKLA; a notorious lot of planting insiders.
Which brings us full circle to these rushed proposals. Keep everything as is for six months, pass an emergency halt and contingency plan FIRST, fix some UI issues and bugs, and then address the complexity of voting distribution. Start with simplicity and gravitate towards complexity.
Heaven forbid someone plants a code bug exploit, and we have no emergency halt mechanism. We are all on the same ship… again.
It’s a double edged sword. Can foresee there will be some important proposals along the road to recovery.
Anyone still remembers waiting for quorum for a couple of key proposals?
@godoal, appreciate your reply and explanation.
Actually the point I am trying to make is not really to give validators equal voting power, but simply to use the power of economic disincentive to discourage users to stake with validators with disproportionately high vp while at the same time building a community treasury. This system can be implement in a gradual way by implementing a tax of <1% (can be adjusted via governance) for stakers who stake with the validator with highest voting power and adjusted down linearly (the degree can be adjusted via governance as well) based on vp until the validator with less than 0.77% vp.
Personally, I believe that 1% tax (as a form of disincentive) on stakers shouldn’t affect the decision of those who stake with validators based on merits (uptime, engagement etc) but rather sway users who choose to stake with validators solely based on commission.
Cheers
Apologies for the misunderstanding @jxboi .That is a good idea as an additional measure to maintain a reasonable NC in the chain… 
@Joe_Smith
They are only signaling proposals to gather the community’s opinion on the matter so there’s no rush to implement. I expect them to be implemented (if voted) in a slow time tbh. If nothing else we must wait and see how the new validators’ activation on the 26th Oct will affect the voting power dynamics…maybe that will be enough!
@Passerby
Double-edged sword indeed! I am pretty certain the Validator community has jumped on this journey with us with both feet so am less concerned with the voting of upcoming proposals and more about the worst-case scenarios. We can get quorum alright but amounts to nothing if a single entity alone can Veto it
@CAprotonInhibitor
That is the essence of all blockchains, Immutability; so it’s a given…
That is not possible, anyone can spin up as many wallets a.k.a new IDs as they like. Hence the “indirect” governance takeover via different identities. If you were to remove this freedom to own any wallet for free on-demand and without paperwork concept from a blockchain you fall back into the realm of a centralized and controlled monetary system.