Hi Duncan. It’s a very interesting proposal. I have a couple of questions though. Firstly, the CEX’s & MM’s are absolute masters at doing what this proposal intends to do through code. It seems possible that they could use the predictability of this mechanism to their own advantage by manipulating the market in unpredictable manners, when it is operating. My second question and rather a recommendation, is that a responsible team be employed to monitor market effects and have ongoing authority to turn it off immediately, if disaster appears to be approaching. A seven day governance proposal to turn this mechanism off is far too long in terms of market fluctuation speeds or bank runs. With hindsight, one of the main factors for our original demise was hesitancy to shut the mechanism down and buy some time to make necessary changes. I believe we still have around 10% USTC supply in the Oracle rewards pool. Can this be utilised in the event of any disasters? Or at least earmarked for use by a responsible team?
The outcome of it is the same to end user.
You see one price listed. Yet you receive less since “non-manipulative” fees and taxes take their share (none of it is clearly visible nor listed).
Yet change the price feed after oracle consensus - that is “manipulating”.
I fail to see the agreed upon monetary policy being different in any of the examples.
What you talking about manipulation 
crypto is whole manipulation industry just wake up n follow the news FTX, Binance wales, shibainu supposed Shitoshi, Elon Musk tweets, etc
We need re peg USTC going to be the big ever Lunc catalyst’s
Perhaps read the comment that I replied to for clarity.
It’s simple to see if this proposal will succeed. Duncan can ask the Binance team if they can share this prop and support with the price fixing. Binance is already communicating with the L1 TF. You can send and receive direct messages with them.
Here’s Binance’s answer that I’m 100% sure.
If you intend to cut off all CEXs and IBCs and make LUNC/USTC like Galapagos Island and operate it, pass this proposal. If it’s not, choose. Whether we remove LUNC/USTC from the Binance trade list or discard the proposal.
If there is any other answer than this one, I will not raise any conflict with DUNCAN’s proposal in the future. But every CEX would answer like that.
Can you elaborate on this ? In particular how/will the re-peg affect the circulating supply of LUNC.?
Unidirectional swaps (LUNC >>> USTC) could take care of this.
Pre-crash, the swaps worked both ways, which led to LUNC’s hyperinflated supply.
We could still enable bilateral swaps, but then you run into the problem of minting more LUNC.
So IIRC, LUNC’s supply has to be brought down to 10B before that can happen.
Shalom! 
What is with this obsession with taxing staking rewards???
Less than 8 percent of all USTC is in the Oracle pool. 92 percent of all USTC is outside it . Even if we decided to tax 100% of all USTC in oracle pool, you would burn around 800 million USTC. It would NOT help with the repeg by much at all!!
@wrapped_dday Much appreciated your efforts towards the USTC repeg. Have been witnessing your activity for several months already.
However, would you or someone else who reads this and familiar with the topic explain if the Ziggy way USTC repeg restores the mAssets value or not? What is the road map for those, if there is any?
Thank you
Anyone know why THORmaximalist voted against this proposal? Seems relatively straight forward step in the right direction to me.
You see one price listed. Yet you receive less since “non-manipulative” fees and taxes take their share (none of it is clearly visible nor listed).
Yet change the price feed after oracle consensus - that is “manipulating”.
Yeah, this is what I’m understanding as well. There is a difference between manipulation of the oracle pricing during the Vote Procedure (as denoted in the #1 discussion), which is why I moved it to post-Vote and pre-Ballot Rewards. It is effectively saying:
- All validators agree on X price, individually, from the Prevote
- After this price is given, add an incentive which modifies the price.
- Then, distribute Ballot Rewards, provided they are within range.
- Then, apply other fee modifiers, such as the tax.
Invariably, it still forces the validators to agree upon the price within consensus. The only problem is where the incentives come from. You could suggest it come from the Ballot Rewards (ie, just decrease the amount of Ballot Rewards given), but most people know how I feel about touching that part.
Perhaps the incentive can be given post-Ballot Rewards via community pool, or a separate pool entirely. If we are focusing on endogenous collateralization, then we want the money to circulate. For example, if USTC = $1.04, we would take $0.04 and send it to this separate pool (“bonds pool”). Then, when we are de-pegged, eg, $0.98, the bonds are paid out.
Semantics-wise, I do not see a difference between manipulation through inflation, tax rates, or other monetary policies, and applying that algorithmically (again, all of which was already done before.)
Hi Duncan. It’s a very interesting proposal. I have a couple of questions though. Firstly, the CEX’s & MM’s are absolute masters at doing what this proposal intends to do through code. It seems possible that they could use the predictability of this mechanism to their own advantage by manipulating the market in unpredictable manners, when it is operating.
Is this different than the government deciding what the Feds Funding Rate is, and after they’ve decided this in the backroom, everyone can make a predictable strategy? (Except for the Fed, who have a headstart.)
The purpose of using algorithms to determine these things and not people in monetary policies is that the algorithm is not fickle. Math cannot lie. People are irrational and will change tax rates because another person didn’t like it (who are often operating from the math standpoint – just see Binance!)
This is when we need to develop open source tooling. White Whale, for example, has an open-source bot. How can we make those more accessible for people? Perhaps we can integrate them into a peer node for them?
My second question and rather a recommendation, is that a responsible team be employed to monitor market effects and have ongoing authority to turn it off immediately, if disaster appears to be approaching. A seven day governance proposal to turn this mechanism off is far too long in terms of market fluctuation speeds or bank runs. With hindsight, one of the main factors for our original demise was hesitancy to shut the mechanism down and buy some time to make necessary changes.
The purpose of the Guard Rails, as outlined in the proposal, is to automatically shut it off when it reaches too far out of scope. Adding conditionals (if-then statements) can also be codified. You could even codify: if USTC = depegged, turn it off. But yes, if necessary, we can add someone to shut it off. It’s more or less an addition to the mechanism that existed prior.
I believe we still have around 10% USTC supply in the Oracle rewards pool. Can this be utilised in the event of any disasters? Or at least earmarked for use by a responsible team?
We can use the Community Pool for this reason. Or, if so desired, a separate pool. Not the Oracle.
If you intend to cut off all CEXs and IBCs and make LUNC/USTC like Galapagos Island and operate it, pass this proposal. If it’s not, choose. Whether we remove LUNC/USTC from the Binance trade list or discard the proposal.
That is why I listed CEXs and other DEXs under “Cross-Market Consensus.” If there is any way our prices affect theirs, we get consensus, or consider this venture DOA.
Can you elaborate on this ? In particular how/will the re-peg affect the circulating supply of LUNC.?
The question is: where does the money come from? Right now most investors are protected through staking rewards and taxes.
So, this proposal is effectively an A > B + B > A swap, instead of prior, which was A > B > A swapping. (Perpetual minting)
However, would you or someone else who reads this and familiar with the topic explain if the Ziggy way USTC repeg restores the mAssets value or not? What is the road map for those, if there is any?
By way of restoring value to USTC, yes, because of the internal exchange rates cast by the Oracle, affecting liquidity pools that tie mAssets with USTC or LUNC.
Otherwise, the roadmap for restoring mAssets, and by extension, Mirror, is to effectively onboard large tradfi institutions. Firstly, if we are issuing synthetic assets from companies with public equities, that’s a problem; so we need to, well, mirror how much public equity is owned and traded before doing so. ie bring them on-chain. Then you need to determine if SEC laws apply to Mirror. It’s more likely that this would be done on Ethereum as contract laws are much easier to determine; but seeing as mAssets are CW20, they would follow something similar.
Anyone know why THORmaximalist voted against this proposal? Seems relatively straight forward step in the right direction to me.
TCB expressed in discussion #2 / #3 that it was “an environment that favored USTC over LUNC.” So, the iterations made have been done to reflect that feedback. Some people are curious whether or not this proposal mints LUNC, which it does not, and I understand that was one of his concerns.
Thx, Duncan. Should we then aim for mirroring BTC and ETH (as mBTC and mETH) in order to leap away from SEC bs? I would consider it as the main task revitalizing mir-Assets if we reach it.
We should forget about m-real stocks for now.
Thank you for such clear and succinct responses Duncan. You are a good man. I hope this all works out well. You have already achieved so much to be proud of IMO.
May I ask a question?
When this proposal be discussed in two months,where are you guys who criticizing now?
Why it is voting now,so many people are criticizing it.And no one try to give some contribution to it in the past two months?
That’s the way of building?That is called constructive discussion?
I am so confused.
Thx, Duncan. Should we then aim for mirroring BTC and ETH (as mBTC and mETH) in order to leap away from SEC bs? I would consider it as the main task revitalizing mir-Assets if we reach it.
We should forget about m-real stocks for now.
We should forget about them until SEC provides information about how to approach synthetics. There is an opportunity to participate in that discussion. However, there are a multitude of reasons why synthetic mAssets (namely, stocks) are unethical.
That can be under a different discussion. You may start one with me on Twitter. I have looked into Mirror’s revival and it is simply not under my power or jurisdiction to OK it.
From what I read and got, the only thing the SEC is chasing for are synths of real stocks, not mBTC/mETH. Is that correct, what do you think?
Many info can be googled regarding SEC vs. DK/TFL/Mirror Protocol tensions, however, they ended pretty much with the fact it should not do nothing with US citizens, am I being mistaken here?
Cannot a new Mirror Protocol with Oracles feeding be done with a disclaimer that it does not offer investments FOR US CITIZENS, for example?
Will probably start a Twitter discussion mentioning you. I suppose we are too poor at the moment with legal base for that. Still, I suppose someone can help with it as it makes a big deal for LUNC/USTC revitalization.
Many info can be googled regarding SEC vs. DK/TFL/Mirror Protocol tensions, however, they ended pretty much with the fact it should not do nothing with US citizens, am I being mistaken here?
Cannot a new Mirror Protocol with Oracles feeding be done with a disclaimer that it does not offer investments FOR US CITIZENS, for example?
The problem is the definition and permissionless systems.
Take, for example, a liquidity pool created permissionlessly on Curve using sbtc + wbtc + renbtc. Create sbtc from Synthetix CDP position using SNX and then swap it for wbtc. What are the implications of this?
Been a long time since I used Mirror (long MIR-UST provisioning) but if you are going to create a synthetic derivative that is unclaimable for its integrand is not necessarily part of permissionless coding. It’s the same ordeal that UST is in. Just made up money.
Anyways – would like to keep this discussion focused on UST repeg / Ziggy, but feel free to start the conversation in another spot.
This type of repeg approach will generate massive on-chain volume between station, CEXs etc due to traders looking for price differences between platforms. Why not add another dimension to it by burning 0.5% of the volume and repurposing it as collateral. Therefore we start to build the collateral over time. We can always swap the USTC for BTC collateral…
Why not add another dimension to it by burning 0.5% of the volume and repurposing it as collateral.
I have a concept for a bonds mechanism which could do exactly that.
It isn’t a vacuum-sealed approach. The way the proposal is worded means anyone can contribute or change ideas within.
IF THE RE-PEG FAILS …
Stable Coin Without Inflation (Vision - Concept)
I fully support the team in their repeg efforts. Otherwise, I don’t understand all the mechanisms, I’m a little scared, but I decided to be there. I voted yes.
However we must alwais think of other options if we fail. In the event that things fall apart and we still somehow remain ‘alive’, I have a vision of a stable coin that might be interesting. I come from Slovenia (Ljubljana), the northernmost of the republics of the former Yugoslavia. I am old enough to remember the HYPERINFLATION we had. At that time, the value of our money was changing (falling) so quickly that you had to immediately exchange all income into German marks on the same day, at the same hour. Then you had to exchange these German marks back into the then hyperinflationary dinars for your daily needs and ran to the shop to buy things… The good thing was that we had at least German marks at our disposal. If today’s euro or dollar were hyperinflationary, we wouldn’t have this option ??? All exchanges took place on the road - on the black market. In fact, very tiring and with huge losses every day.
I’m very happy that Crypto and DeFi came along because I think it offers new fair opportunities to regular people.
I find Bitcoin useless as a means of payment due to its volatility, and it is also becoming too valuable for everyday use. That’s why stablecoins are a good idea. But I don’t like that they are peged to fiat money. By tying stablecoins to fiat, we automatically agree to all weaknesses, manipulations and subordination to traditional financial and banking structures.
Therefore, we need a completely autonomous crypto stable coin that will disable all influence (manipulation) by the old financial structures.
We need a real STABLE COIN WITH NO INFLATION. It can be tied, for example, to the level of standard living expenses. Such a coin could be really attractive, since the value of your input would not decrease. Eventually, people would gain confidence and an idea of its value. (For example: ‘I need 100 coins for one month’) It could become a global means of payment, resistant to various influences and manipulations by governments. No one could arbitrarily print this money and lower its real value. This would be a real crypto adoption in everyday life.
Then all you need is a ‘CRYPTO DEBIT CARD’ in your pocket and you’ve won!
It seems to me that the crypto world has not yet taken this step, but sooner or later it will have to. Only in this way will it finally separate itself from the old, manipulative financial structures.
… LUNC, Terra … if our repeg fails and we ‘still stay alive’, we could leave our stablecoin at this value as it is. Otherwise, I don’t know how you tie the value of a stable coin to the standard cost of living, but if we somehow do it, we will catch up and overtake the value of the dollar in a few years anyway. So then the debts are also paid off. Therefore, we would not need to make any effort to repeg.
Well, that’s all for now - food for thought.
P.S.: I have to express my gratitude to everyone who contributed in any way to the survival of our project. Thank you.