10% is still too high. As i write this, lowering the VP to 10% would affect 1 validator - All Nodes. But if we dropped it to 7% only 3 would he affected. At 6% it affect only 4.
6% in my opinion is a reasonable VP limit and 126 validators would not be affected by this change.
I think the best compromise would be to cap VP but not the number of coins that can be delegated to any particular validator. I would not want to see a professional, well run validator financially penalised through a proposal of this type.
I wholeheartedly agree with the minimum commission being set to 5%. Right now the blockchain is basically for sale to anyone who can organise themselves properly.
I understand the purpose of this proposal.
I would suggest not to push small validators to rise their commission, but to oblige those who exceed 2,5% of VP to establish at least a 5% commission.
This would encourage small validators to grow more so to make the chain more decentralized.
How does a loss-leading business strategy benefit the chain? By its nature, it benefits the validator not the customer - they donāt run nodes out of generosity.
20% VP is dangerous. Effectively, a group of validators only need 30% to control the chain - not 50% as advertised. We have seen recently how the community can be duped into voting through a terrible proposal (TRās robo-hoover debacle). It was Ā£150k this time; next time it could be more serious, and 30% voting power would be enough to prevent that being reversed.
In my opinion, 0% commission rates actively work against the best interests of the community. The sooner we can get a minimum limit through the better.
I do completely agree with this proposal. We need stop those validators doing 0% commissions getting more n more delegations, itās not fair for validators doing the right thing as lunc ado, stake bin, BTC, stake.com, lunastation, Happy catty crypto, moonshot and so many more.
We need decentralisation the chain given more chance for validator with less than 0.50% voting power to participate in all the decisions too
As a small validator, I can relate to this proposal. Iāve started a validator node as soon as new validators were allowed to join in November. After working for two weeks to learn how to build the node myself in AWS and building out a server from scratch, I realized it would be cheaper and more reliable to host via a provider instead. AllNodes.com provides excellent hosting service, btw. Iām running now for the 3rd month at a loss. What costs about $1200 a month in expenses, brings only $100 in revenue and thatās with 5% commission. Not being a YouTuber or having an alternative source of income to cover these costs, I must decide whether to continue spending $1,100 a month just to support the chain.
When other validators are not charging any commission at all, Iām curious how they are able to make ends meet. Folks staking their money think validators make bank - they donāt. You make a % of $ staked or delegated to you and only from their earnings and not from the principal.
While Iām 62nd in the list with 640 mil in delegations, it would take 10 times that much for me just to break even. I would do much better taking that money and buying LUNC and staking with someone else. So, why would I continue to be a validator if I lose money every month?
The more validators are allowed to have 0% commission, the more people will stake with them and small validators like me trying to start a business will fail. I support having a reasonable minimum, so we can earn from providing computing power to the chain.
From voting power perspective, I think it should be proportionate to the delegated funds and not artificially controlled as suggested here.
My 2 cents,
LUNA legend
Alternate revenue streams. As you mentioned yourself, some of them run YouTube channels, and others may have nodes on different chains as well.
IIRC the validator rewards from the Oracle pool are doled out by the protocol on a curved payout scheme. So the higher you are in the active set, the more youāll getā¦ and vice versa.
Good question. Exactly the type of problem weāre trying to fix with the MCF raise to 5%.
Well said.
I personally disagree, but I respect your opinion.
Thanks for taking the time to write your reply here, itās always good hearing directly from validators.
10% is too highā¦ I mean WTF there is only one val at that levelā¦
Should be no more than 5% for VPā¦ And Iām not saying restrict delegations to 5%ā¦
Just VP to 5%.
5% minimum fee is a reasonable start.
Hey. Nice proposal. I just have some quick notes on it and I already contacted you on the matter via direct message in Discord:
When you raise the minimum commission for every single validator in the same way, then you will have absolutely NO economic incentives for delegators to delegate with smaller validators. The minimum commission MUST be a monotonically increasing function of the voting power.
I like the voting power cap as well. I think using both instruments will be more effective. However, I think it should be a parameter that can be changed through governance. This way the community has means to decrease that cap even further without future code changes.
The cap should BY NO MEANS lead to forcefully redelegating people in order to enforce the cap. This would be censorship. I see the cap as threshold that can be passed from the upside, but never passed from below.
i think having max VP Set to 10% wont change many thing, bcz top 10 Validators still own 70% of vote even more.
instead I propose to increase the Quorum , Pass threshold to 70% or set the quorum percentage proportional to the sum of the top 10 validators if its possible
Interesting proposal and debate is always useful.
As an individual operating TerraCVita validator we are way off double figure VP, however factors that influence delegator choice should be the the key factors to harness when it comes to influencing who delegates where.
Simply having 5% MC is a race to the bottom for quality, and feels like it focusses more on paying validators than ensuring quality of service. Simply having a minimum gives no incentive to improve, and also does not allow new validators to offer a 0% VP onboarding drive.
However there does need to be incentive for delegators to redelegate and a financial incentive appears the better option.
Personally i currently prefer something simple such as:
Top 33% get 15% MC
Top 67% get 7.5% MC
Or alternatively a banded approach to allow competion between bands VP bands. This allows for excellence in customer service to still pursue more delegations and rewards those validators that deliver this.
I disagree with lower max VP again because it puts a cap on customer service, and serves no function. As A.E points out, a top validator can simply strike up a new validator and direct its loyal customers to its 2nd validator. If delegators think a 5, 10, 15, 20% commission is worth the price, it should be their choice.
I disagree. I believe smaller validators should compete by offering a better service (higher uptime, frequent participation in governance, community outreach, etc.), instead of poaching the big boysā VP through 0% commission fees (which basically forces them to run in the red, and sets a bad precedent for the entire chain). As for having a dynamically-scaling commissions fee tied to VP, yes, I agree that would be a good change. But itāll require extra coding work. For the time being I think we should get the static 5% passed, and then we can later add dynamic fees on top of that to have it overwrite the static model once all the coding and testing has been completed.
Agreed 100% with you on it being parametrized. I think @ek826 mentioned the VP cap was hardcoded, so the L1 team would have to change that to a parameter setupā¦ but thatās beyond the scope of this proposal, and would require extra work from them.
I agree. If the VP cap proposal passes governance then any validator over 10% could never gain additional VP, but they could steadily lose it through organic re-delegations until they reach that level. Weād have to check with the L1 team again to see how all this would be handled, but Iām confident theyāre up to the task.
i think having max VP Set to 10% wont change many thing, bcz top 10 Validators still own 70% of vote even more.
instead I propose to increase the Quorum , Pass threshold to 70% or set the quorum percentage proportional to the sum of the top 10 validators if its possible
i think having max VP Set to 10% wont change many thing, bcz top 10 Validators still own 70% of vote even more.
instead I propose to increase the Quorum , Pass threshold to 70% or set the quorum percentage proportional to the sum of the top 10 validators if its possible
I only partially agree with that statement: sure, organic incentivization is always great, but chain security and long-term prosperity should be a major point as well. And a chain with fewer but more consolidated validators is less secure than one with a robust and highly decentralized active set (even if the latter case requires a bit of nudging to get there via proposals such as this one).
I disagree, and for all the reasons I outlined when responding to Frag a couple posts above this one. The fact of the matter is that more entrenched validators have an edge over fresh ones trying to break into the active set. If anything, raising the fee levels out the playing field so the less affluent ones can catch up. If you want a race to the bottom then 0% commission fees are the fastest way to get there.
I spoke with Frag about that via DMs. Yeah, I generally agree that having a dynamic scaling fee tied to VP would be a good way to go. However it requires extra coding and probably a lot of testing to ensure it doesnāt break something critical in the chain. The static 5% minimum fee (as proposed here) is a good intermediary step IMHO. We can always build on that later and implement dynamic fees as a function of validator VP.
Iām not familiar with this concept.
Customer service should come secondary to the chainās health and longevity. As far as there being no function in VP caps, again, I disagree - its function is to limit overt centralization and control of governance. Also, A.E. is right in theory but wrong in practice (as is often the case with him): a top validator can direct their delegators to a spin-off node, but how many will follow? How many will care? Most people are apathetic vis-Ć -vis governance initiatives, they stake their tokens and forget. And finally, Iām a fan of the free market as much as anyone, but sometimes the playing field requires leveling; the original batch of validators have had a massive and unearned advantage over the later ones following the re-enablement of stakingā¦ if we want the chain to prosper, we need to give the small guys a hand.
Thanks for taking the time to leave feedback, itās always appreciated.
