Providing flexible Unstaking options : { 0 days} , { 7 days} and { 21 days}


This proposal aims to stabilize the price of the currency by implementing a variable staking withdrawal mechanism. Currently, staking and rewards are the main uses of Lunc. However, due to the volatility of the coin price, many people are hesitant to lock their coins for a fixed period of 21 days.


To illustrate the problem, let us consider the following example: a user performs staking of a certain amount of coins because he trusts the project. However, if he disagrees with a proposal presented in the governance system that he considers detrimental to his investment, he will want to “undelegate”. However, in this scenario, he would have to wait 21 days to have his coins available, which prevents him from moving them to a centralized exchange (CEX) and selling them. Although this seems beneficial for price stability, the investor will actually prefer to keep his coins in a CEX to be able to sell them in case of unexpected events, since the 21-day deadline is too long.

Therefore, the proposal consists of adopting a flexible “vesting” system. Instead of just waiting 21 days, we could offer other options, such as 21 days, 7 days, and even an instant option. For example, if a user wants to “undelegate” but doesn’t mind waiting 21 days, he won’t be penalized, maintaining the current functioning. On the other hand, if the user identifies an unfavorable proposal and wants to “undelegate” before its approval, he will have a 7-day unstake option , but this will incur a cost. For example, he will have to pay 7% of the total rewards received in the last 21 days, corresponding to the amount he intends to unlock.

In addition, we will offer the option of “unstake now” for those who want to quickly unlock their funds. However, this option will have an additional cost. For example, if the user opts for instant unstake, he will have to pay 50% of the rewards received in the last 21 days for the amount to be unlocked.

Example of a user who staked 2 million coins and wants to unstake 1 million. If he chooses to wait 21 days, then he only needs to wait 21 days.

Option 1: Waiting time for unstake in 21 days.

Let T be the waiting time in days.

T = 21

If he activates the unstake option in 7 days, then after 7 days he will have his coins, but with a deduction of 7% of the rewards that staking earned in the last 21 days.

Option 2: Deduction of 7% of rewards for unstaking in 7 days.

Let R be the total value of rewards received in 21 days.

R = 20,000 coins

Deduction = 7% * R

Let D be the deducted value.

D = 0.07 * R

In the case of the example, D = 0.07 * 20,000 = 1400 coins.

In the case he chooses to do instant unstake, the amount to be paid would increase to 50%, which means, in this example10000 coins would be withdrawn.

Option 3: Value to be paid for instant unstake.

Payment = 50% * R

Let P be the value to be paid.

P = 0.50 * R

In the case of the example, P = 0.50 * 20,000 = 10000 coins.

These equations represent the corresponding values to the mentioned examples, providing a numerical basis for the different unstake options.

These additional payments can be directed to feed the “Oracle pool,” “community pool,” and “burn.” In addiction , they can be allocated to a new pool to support the collateral related to USTC re-peg, distributed as follows: 25% to “OP,” 25% to “CP,” 25% to “Burn,” and the remaining 25% to the collateral.


The goal of this proposal is to attract more users to stake on the chain by providing flexible unlocking options that reduce the fear of the lock-up period. Additionally, it aims to stabilize the price by removing many coins from circulation, as supporting burn, funding of Community pool , oracle pool, and even a possible re peg.

Please give your feedback , thanks


Grandissima proposta, complimenti


If we want to competite with ADA, SOL, HBAR, NEAR or Flare which have 0 or one or two days unstaking period we should change it immidiatelly. Only self confident chains can afford it. Are we?


far too cheap, a percentage of stake not of rewards


I propose to make some amendments:
1 No more than 30% of all coins are allowed to be unlocked immediately.
2 The maximum tax for instant unlock should be no more than 10,5%.The tax is taken from all unlockable coins. The tax scale should be progressive in 0.5% increments.


I’ll vote NO on this proposal. I think will bring additional volatility and stake ratio criteria will become irrelevant.

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I support this proposal, however in the case of sending funds to fire and pool oracle, I am against it. Because we need to create this pool that readline thought of and make unilateral exchanges of LUNC=>USTC. This would burn more than anything that has ever been created, and I also think that the 0.5% burn tax should go to this pool. This would attract more transactions on the blockchain. But if the community accepts the way you proposed without any changes, I already consider it a great initiative and victory. Thanks for the proposal.

This is a great idea, I fully support it!


We have reached the point where we are going to discuss what I proposed a few months ago, but due to the turbulent period on our blockchain, I have decided to stay aside for a while. I believe my proposal and the many comments in this thread can help complement Vegas’s proposal. I think this proposal deserves a discussion. And I think we should find a consensus where an enormous majority will agree. Otherwise, it will not be good.


I’m fond of this proposal and I think it’s the right time to implement it.
I’m ok with the allocation of the penalized rewards.
Having said that I would be more aggressive with the penalty. For example, 7 days is the 1/3 of the default redemption period at the moment, so a 30% penalty on the rewards at the time could be applied. For fast redemption, zero days, a 75% penalty could be applied. As a reference, you can see what happens when a user asks for fast redemption on Binance; initial capital is freed the other day but with no rewards at all. For other chains other community members can provide us with the relevant details.

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I all open to discussion.tks for your feedback :slight_smile:


@Vegas I think 0 days should be 100% because we are in a moment where we need to have this control of circulating supply. If you serve deserves to be punished with 100% I think it’s very fair.


Too confusing to calculate if it’s taken from the staking rewards, especially if the person manually autocompounds his/her rewards. Just tax it to the undelegated amount, like maybe 1-5% if they want to undelegate early.


It has to be competitive. Binance has instant payouts on Earn, but much smaller rewards. Users get much less tokens than normal. We should give a higher percentage than binance so that it pays off, but not too much.

I am not able to calculate today whether these rates are appropriate. I have too much work. Unless you’ve already calculated it? @Vegas

If I was an average user, is it profitable for me to transfer tokens from CEX? Remember the 0.5 tax. @Vegas
The feature of automatically adding rewards to the Earn amount on Binance is also nice. You could think about it. Prizes from the machine delegated to the PREVIOUSLY selected validator.

Sliding scale with option to choose from instant to up to 20 day unstake period and the WHOLE BAG is taxed & burned. If instant undelegation, 50% unstaked bag is burned

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It’s about time for this to be brought up :clap:t3::clap:t3:.
Thanks Vegas.

I love the idea and here are my thoughts:

I am aligned to the purpose.
Staking is a key part of removing coins from circulation. This should remain a focus for LUNC through any endeavour.

To me, LUNC’s number 1 goal (besides the obvious L1 blochain goals of creating use case and utility) is to reduce it’s supply - both circulating supply and total supply and restore it to its former price and glory. I firmly believe that it is possible.


As Vegas states.

Low % of total supply staked is an issue that LUNC currently faces. The main cause of the issue is easily addressed and therefore should be seen as a quick win.

Many users / traders / holders don’t stake their coins because they are deterred by the 21 day un-staking period.
From personal experience, I agree that this is too long.
When LUNC reaches profit targets, holders and traders would like to have the power to un-stake faster if not instantly to take profit.

For this reason majority of traders / holders have remained off-chain and hold their coins in other wallets or CEX’s.

Therefore, it is wise to address the un-staking period problem by implementing a solution that aims to solve core issues.
The issues being:
• Questions around sustainability of the rewards rate (or APR)
• The over-supply of LUNC

The solution being:
• Fast un-staking for a fee which feeds burns and the rewards pool.


I like the idea of having un-staking periods.
I would agree with the 2 options of 7 days and 0 days (instant).

I think it might complicate the amount of work required if the fee is based on rewards accrued.
Also, this method could be unfair towards users who have staked for longer.

Users who have staked longer should not be punished by having to pay higher fees than others. We want to encourage holders to stake longer and thus should not charge them more than anyone else.

Therefore, in my opinion, maybe the more fair and simple solution would be to base the un-staking fee on a fixed % of the coins to be un-staked?
For example:
• 0.5% fee for 7 days and 1% fee for 0 days; or
• 1.5% fee for 7 days and 2% for 0 days.

If the fee is too low, it could introduce volatility which we don’t want.
We don’t want to encourage un-staking.
We only want to enable a user to un-stake faster.
For this reason we want to choose a balanced fee - a fee that is not too high for a trader or holder to give up on taking good profits, but also not low enough for fly by night traders who like to swap from one coin to the next.


LUNC has a much higher APR than other chains such as ADA and SOL.
Given the much higher APR, it seems fair that a fee could be charged for fast un-staking.
The higher APR would also be sustained for longer through the un-staking fee allocation. The fee can be utilised to sustain the ecosystem.

Having said that, LUNC is unique and has unique problems to solve… therefore I don’t believe it’s fair to judge LUNC by the standards of other chains. LUNC must be aligned to solving its own problems.


Flexible un-staking fees should be used towards the goal of burning coins and feeding the rewards pool to sustain the staking ecosystem only.

If fees are spread into too many pools, we risk diluting the positive effects of the fee to the point where users might not see the reason for the fee which eventually leads to a vote to get rid of it. We would not want that to happen.

There are already other mechanisms in place to feed the community pool and those mechanisms should be treated with the same risk mentioned above. Those mechanisms need to remain focused on their purpose and should not be diluted.

Back to fee structure:
I would imagine a main purpose of keeping the rewards pool sustained with secondary purpose of reducing total supply (burning).

A fee split of 60/40 (60% rewards pool / 40% burning) sounds good.

My feeling is that it would be a bad idea to mix the fee up with the USTC re-peg as well… For the risk of diluting the fee’s effects.
The focus of this fee should be kept on the staking ecosystem.

If we’re thinking about USTC, then I would consider donating excess fees accrued (from all fee / tax mechanisms) to a USTC pool. That would be if there are any excess funds from fees to donate. That is a discussion for another forum though.

I can’t think of anything else to address on this topic. I am excited by the idea and think it is highly necessary!

The importance of LUNC staking has been too understated to date. We now have the power and vision to do something about it and the way to do it is by thinking of sustaining the LUNC ecosystem.

NinjaCat :ninja:t3::black_cat:

I believe penalty should be from staked amount and not the amount of rewards in a given time. Should be much easier to calculate & implement.

I support LuncPredator’s proposal, though it could have minor changes here and there.


No with a Veto


The idea is not bad, but I believe it should be deducted from the stake rather than the rewards. There is a reason why there is a 21-day unstaking period. If you have the opportunity to bypass it by only paying a deduction on the rewards of the last 21 days, sorry, but that is way too little. If the day comes when LUNC suddenly increases by 3x or more in a few days, I don’t care about foregoing a few earnings. I would even be willing to give up 100% of the last 21 days because it doesn’t matter much.

No, you must pay appropriately for this privilege, and in my opinion, it should be as follows:

Instant: 50% of the stake
7 Days: 20% of the stake
14 Days: 10% of the stake
21 Days (Standard): 0% of the stake