1st type of people: they want to stake on the chain, they will do it regardless of the unlock time.
2nd type of people: does not stake on the chain due to the high duration
3rd type of people: does not want to stake.
4th type of people: they stake on the chain but are too emotional to the sudden changes in price.
The 1st type of people will not unstake only and solely because there is the possibility to do it faster. If this type of investor takes an unstake he simply no longer believes in the project, or he does it in 1 day or 21 days, little changes in the long term.
the 2nd type of people could probably accept this compromise by paying a penalty in case they want to rush to sell.
the 3rd type of people could be completely disinterested in the proposal.
the 4th type of person is the one who could actually take advantage of the advantages offered by the proposal by paying the penalty.
Considering the slight increase in the current stake and the fact that it has been a while since we dropped below 13%, I assume that at the moment most of the stakers belong to what I have considered to be within the 1st category of people. If one of these leaves the stake, it probably does so forever.
2nd type and 3rd type of people might be more interested.
the 2nd type of people might increase the lunc bet percentage a little and the 4rd might lower it slightly. at the level of bet lunc I think the benefits would be reduced, but all in all it could benefit from it. the greatest advantage would come from the burn for thoughtful unstakes from this type of staker.
the tax should be applied to the full amount of lunc delegated, for ease of calculation and because the staker could compaund during his stake. otherwise the fee could be equal to the excess approximation of x staking days (regardless of how long the staker held his luncs).
Having said that, the proposed percentages seem absurd to me.
a good 3-5% instant commission is just fine.
If, ironically, everyone wanted to unstake today with this instant fee (and the entire amount of the fee would be burned):
14,820% of the entire supply is staked
everyone unbonds so you burn 3% letâs say.
0.44% of the entire supply would have burned immediately. Like about half of all burns to date, simultaneously the staking reward would increase and this incentivizes new stakers.
instant unbond 3-5%
7 day unbond 1.2 %
unbonded at 21 0.
If someone uses models to be able to improve the percentages, well, but I think it is reasonable and profitable above all, attracting some new stakers and being able to increase some burns if someone is emotional, using low but effective taxes.
no one would pay the 10% or even 50% unstake fee right away, at least no whale. maybe he would pay 3% (and Iâm not even so sure) if he thinks the price could crash. Also the more the price goes down the more the binance burns could increase at the next pump.
I fully support the general thesis of this proposal. Perhaps the percentages or the amount of time that is subject to the service fee could be amended. But these are more details as opposed to the entirety of the idea.
Considering only the rewarded amount for a specific stake is subject to the fee, I see no issue with this as a users initial coin accumulation is not messed with.
On the amount of days subject to the fee, I would propose that it we elongated to perhaps 60 days, which is roughly 2 months. Simply due to the fact that staking is intended to be a long term financial vehicle and if your intent is not to remain staked for an extended period of time or you feel the fundamental aspects of the chain warrant and immediate unstaking, then the penalty or fee should be equally punitive. This fee should also work as a deterrent against the service it provides. If someone wants to immediately unstake, then it should be a difficult and costly action.
On the percentages proposed, I have no real input, perhaps make the 7 unlock option a 10% fee.
Beyond that I have no real input besides my complete support for the idea.
but 10% of what?
because of the entire delegated amount it seems absurd to me, of the entire amount of the rewards, it is enough for me to withdraw the rewards and then I unstake for 7 days to pay nothing
Letâs apply immediately, I will take my staked coins faster and faster. because I want to sell coins there is no hope for this coin to $ 1 or return to ATH before the luna collapses, because the community and groups here are toxic filled by bad actors to take advantage of themselves and their groups. letâs implement it so that the staking time is shortened and itâs up to you to cut it as you like, because itâs better to invest in coins that have a clear community with a vision and mission to build each other, not in the interests of bad actors and their groups to take profits like this block chain. good luck to you guys with this toxic community. and not abandoned by other investors.
âIn addiction , they can be allocated to a new pool to support the collateral related to USTC re-peg, distributed as follows: 25% to âOP,â 25% to âCP,â 25% to âBurn,â and the remaining 25% to the collateral.â
^ I def agree with this, if it can have a positive effect on the repeg while building pools for community imo canât go wrong. In addition to basically upgrading as to other chains out there that offer such an option as this. Careful consideration is a must and must. Hopefully there wonât be a whitelisting of wallets to deter from this so to speak?
Lo harĂa mĂĄs sencillo
7 dĂas : 60% de las recompensas
0dias 100% de las recompensas
Los fondos irĂan al fondo comunitario. Desde el fondo comunitario se decidirĂĄ con otras propuestas donde gastarlo.
Not to mention victims of scams⌠if you have instant unstaking they have no hope of recovering their staked funds. with 21 day unstaking they have time to find a service like cosmosrescue.com who can frontrun the scammer.
I cannot see any benefits to this proposal at all.
Iâd argue that the 4th type of people are the ones who will kick themselves for doing so because they panic sell on emotion
I like the proposal. And my take is make it 7, 14, 21 days but with no fee. Who ever wants to go let them go. The Chain will gain on transaction fees, and long term stakers will gain on apy.
do you want to tell them how to invest? I donât think itâs a topic on which to moralize. selling early can cost you money. but it can cause you to lose less than you would if you were standing still. you make an investment, then you take responsibility for it, if you canât do it, you donât invest.
like everything there is who earns and who pays, if you stay at the counter you have to see how to earn and this solution can give us advantages, as well as those who want to take advantage of them and know how to exploit them.
Basically,this topic is nonsense.no need for this,it canât improve our chain.
I like the idea.
21 days no penalty
14 days penalty 15% of reward
7 days penalty of 30% of reward
immediate 60% penalty of reward
The penalty for immediate withdrawal must be large because it is not beneficial for us and should be a bit of a deterrent. These rates will be competitive with Binanceâs offering
first of all it would be interesting for you to argue your thesis, as well as justifying your thought it can give new ideas to others. if your âwhyâ is âbecause yesâ better not comment and look at what others write. hoping they have ideas and not guesses based on intuition.
but excuse me first of all, when you propose a good or a service, you need to understand who you are addressing our proposal. the proposal must be advantageous for both and above all it must not harm the âold customersâ on the contrary they must benefit from it too. if Iâve been staking for 1 year and want to unstake immediately, can I ever have to pay 50% rewards? it is not fair to those who have been staking for 1 year and it is beneficial for those who have been staking for a day. % on rewards is useless. as I could collect the rewards and then decide to unstake instantaneously. better to charge a fee by rounding up (or short) the reward estimate to x days (21 days or any other number of days) this means that if I now stake lunc and after One minute I want to unstake instant I will pay the equivalent of 21 days of rewards and it doesnât matter if I actually staked it for 21 days or not. otherwise you can think about the percentage of the total staked (obviously some reasonable figures) in a comment earlier I wrote 3-5% but 1.5%-2% would also be fine. just make some estimates if everyone did unstake immediately how much percentage of lunc would be burned, to see the goodness of the hypothesized percentage, but it must be realistic. it needs to be low enough to encourage non-stakers today to do so and eventually walk out at a loss if they want to. we have to consider that those who believe in the project probably wonât unstake under any circumstances, except if the project is declared almost d3ad, but at that point, whether itâs 21 days or immediately, it doesnât change much, right?
Generally âold customersâ wonât suffer from âmy ideaâ or any of the others here because they now only have the â21 daysâ options anyway, all weâre talking about here are just additional options.
The second thing.
I donât know if I understood you correctly. Pay in advance for 21 days and withdraw immediately. This idea is definitely unacceptable. If someone didnât have enough prizes, they would have to pay from their bag. Itâs not good to move your purse. It looks bad. THESE bags are great.
Third thing
It is more profitable for LUNC that these funds are staked as long as possible. Therefore, these taxes must be high enough to discourage people from the immediate option. But at the same time give them the option to withdraw immediately. If you want to withdraw right away ok but if you want to do it tax free wait 21 days like now. And only from prizes NOTHING from the bag.
My proposal is addressed to both sides. If we introduce a low tax or no tax on the instant option, it can become very unstable for the LUNC
@Vegas
The idea is not bad, but it has a very serious hole. I GUESS
Correct me if Iâm wrong.
Currently staked is ~969,000,000,000 tokens = ~$87,210,000 which is not so much for whales especially groups
Hypothetical Situation
The whales have enough money to mess up the vote.
They donât care about the prizes or whether tax will be collected from it.
They put LUNC short
An extremely bad proposal is added. Anyone can submit proposals.
Anyone can also be a validator and one validator will vote YES for an extremely bad proposal.
The whales, not worrying about the money, will raise his voting power FOR THE MOMENT so that it will beat all others.
Voting will end.
The whales will withdraw their money (they donât care about prizes)
LUNC falls they gain
Isnât that a potential attack backdoor?
Thank you in advance for your answer.
Technically, a single whale can override the entire governance.
You need about 360b for exclusive veto rights.
Validator doesnt matter. As long as you stake.
E: Amount is subject to the rest of the staking pool.
pay the equivalent of 21 days (assumption) of rewards. regardless of the number of staking days done. then, if you donât have enough money from rewards, you pay from the purse. just like you said. thatâs what I meant. I said old customers they will resent because you talk about % on rewards. suppose there are two people: 1st bet 1,000,000 for a year 2nd tip 1,000,000 today (assuming there is instant unstake) the 1st will pay 10% on a yearâs stake (you spoke of % on rewards and not on the equivalent of x number of days of rewards) the 2nd will pay practically 0. (because if we are talking about a % of the rewards and the rewards are pennies, it will pay a percentage of these.) beyond this, as I have already said, it is possible to withdraw and then make an instant unstake, therefore it is better to think by âequivalent of stake rewardsâ or % of the amount you withdraw (purse + hypothetical accrued rewards). however if you are expecting an increase in the total stake from this move, you need to go and find that type of person what he wants so that he is willing to bet his luncs. you, as a long-term owner, are interested yes, that the stake increases, but that if it should go down, that at least you gain from the burns. Having said that, if the % goes down, the staking rewards lengthen and this already acts as an incentive. a percentage of 3-5 percent is perhaps even too much for an Instant unstake but could be fine in a panic situation. reason absurdly. everyone wants to unstake, therefore around 14.8%. if the tax is 3% (applied to the bag + any accrued rewards) you burn 0.44% of the total supply in an instant. but this hypothesis is of little importance, because a situation of this type would have had the same outcome even without the tax, waiting the 21 days. in any case simultaneously the burns extended, the price falls, the rewards for staking lengthened and a new equilibrium is found, with the supply contracted. In my opinion it is more profitable for the funds to be burned rather than staked, but with a fair but contained percentage you can obtain the right compromise between the two benefits. small increase in the amount of lunc staked and those emotional investors who now want to sell can do it by burning a small percentage of their portfolio, the holders thank.
The security of the chain comes first! No one is forced to accept it, they can also wait for the 21 days!
What if Lunc triples in a day during a bull market? My suggestion prevents damage to the chain due to too many undelegations. If we keep the fees low, then itâs worth it for some percentages to undelegate immediately and then take the 3x profit directly on a CEX. 50% fees make this less attractive and compensates the chain for it. Moreover, the user would still make a profit in the event of a high increase, and for many paperhands, it wouldnât matter.
Do you know the reason why only 14% are staked? I donât plan to stake my 500k. Let the market move what has to move. Whales are always going to make the price fluctuate.