Distribute the $4M in Off-Chain Community Assets Towards LUNC’s Revitalization

[AlephA]

A few more tidbits that came up while reading some of the comments:

I share the rationale by a TR member. In which he clearly says that they do not need payment for the work already done. Which has been given for free. On the other hand, it also clarifies that from now on they may require a specific payment to continue with their development and work.

@raider7019

After almost 6 months of free of charge voluntary work, and having delivered everything we said we would deliver, we now reserve the right to require payment for further efforts and we will try to find funding for that from any sources we feel are appropriate. We would prefer not to ask for any money from the community, and at the same time we of course welcome community donations that are made voluntarily to us.

We also welcome other development teams to come to this ecosystem and work for the benefit of the Terra Classic community and share the burden with TR.

Prior to that, it clarifies the following:

@raider7019

@reXxTR said, Terra Rebels is a private organisation made up of a group of collaborating community members. We have the right to promote ourselves and find funding from any sources that we feel make sense for us.

And also:

@raider7019

For any development team to make changes to the way the core protocol functions, absolutely a governance vote is required. Fixing an emergency bug in the core protocol that does not change the way the protocol operates, but for example requires the expedient closing of a security flaw (as occurred with the dragonberry update) does not require a governance vote.

@raider7019

Absolutely I agree that the Terra Classic community is and must be the body that sets the vision and direction for the Terra Classic blockchain, via the governance system. TR as members of the community will participate in that process or may even initiate the discussion on a particular topic, but always the final decision on future direction will be made through the governance system.

I also agree with what @reXxTR said:

@reXxTR

I’m not sure what BS you’re referring to. I’d like to make one thing clear as there seems to be a misunderstanding. The deal is between Neblio and TR, not Neblio and the community. Terra Rebels is a private org and does not represent the Luna Classic community and never will.

Unfortunately, the community does not have a say in what outside funding a private org secures for themselves and this is the reality of it. We are not owned by the community and never will be.

And finally, the icing on the cake of this TR financing issue:

@reXxTR

You are correct, if you’re staked, you have a vote on proposals. Validators are the ones that keep the chain running.

I understand that there are proposals to “fund TR” but we have taken the stance to turn down any and all funding from the $4.1m and from the community. Just because the community raises a proposal to fund TR doesn’t mean we need to accept it.

Therefore, again as stated here (as in other cases I mention below), it would make no sense whatsoever to designate funds for these developers.

@RabbiJebediah

30% - Direct fiat payout to Terra Rebels, to be split among their members according to the group’s internal voting/agreement, in order to compensate them all for months of unpaid work.

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On the other hand, with respect to this point

@RabbiJebediah

10% - Fiat reserve to be placed aside under the jurisdiction of the Terra Rebels development & programming sub-team, for the explicit purpose of funding hardware/endpoints if TFL withdraws support and leaves LUNC out to dry

It would be convenient to establish a budget provided by the TFL team or by TR, as the case may be, for the cost of maintenance of such equipment, on the one hand. And on the other hand, with the money allocated to it, estimate how long it could be sustained without requesting funds again for the same purpose. And to show it in a transparent way to the community. As mentioned by two of the members of TR in this section that I am sharing with you.

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Another point that makes noise is the following. Zaradar, with the possibility of acting at will in its entirety.

@RabbiJebediah

This fund would be under the direct control and supervision of Zaradar (Tobias Andersen), who would write and award “programming bounties” for needed blockchain work, and delegate them to external non-TR devs (with full transparency to the community, of course: ie, the work being done, the individual sub-contrated to do it, the agreed-upon price, the general time-frame for delivery, etc.)

We have tried this in the past, with one person or team having centralized decisions and management of funds at their discretion. And it didn’t work out so well. So why stumble over the same stone again.

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Again here, it is mentioned that the team can use the funds in a discretionary manner, it is not an interpretation or hypothesis. It is their own words.

@RabbiJebediah

Within those 6 months, however, the Quant Team is free to try and grow this fund by using 50% of it to acquire yield in whichever way they deem best (the other 50% must remain untouched, in case the first half is mismanaged). Duncan and the Quant Team retain the right to choose in which form these assets are held and grown (fiat, crypto, a combination of the two, etc.)

Without knowing what they will do with these funds in a transparent manner.

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Therefore, this allocation of funds, should go separately.

@RabbiJebediah

4% - Fiat or crypto collateral to be set aside for helping the eventual re-peg of LUNC’s potential stablecoin/AFT when the time comes.

In a different proposal where it is well specified what will be done with that money being requested. No discretion.

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Same for funds to Edward.

@RabbiJebediah

3% - Payment of funds to Professor Edward Kim’s scholarship program (http://terragrantsfoundation.org/ ), to further strengthen and assist in the development of new utilities for our growing network.

That a proposal be submitted as to where the requested grant funds would go.

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And if you say that alex is of no interest

@RabbiJebediah

No one cares about Alex the person - the aim is to dismantle his platform, which is an atavistic remnant of his time spent with Terra Rebels. He enjoys an undue amount of influence and reach due to that, and he abuses it to no end.

Why then do you assign this percentage to Alex. just “for good searcher”?

@RabbiJebediah

1% - Direct fiat fiat payout to Mr. Alexander Forshaw as a "finder’s fee

For all the points highlighted above, there seems to be no consistency between what is said and what is actually done.

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Finally with regard to the point you mention here

@RabbiJebediah

No, this proposal is not similar to Mr. Forshaw’s - there is no centralization here, because there are no long-term managerial, un-elected, undemocratic, undoxxed committees. The Tribunal outlined above is voluntary, unpaid, doxxed, trusted, temporary, and most of all REPLACABLE - if they refuse to undertake the assigned duties, the legal council(ors) will take over and process those tasks

So, yes there is centralization, but in a different way. Instead of being only one team of 9 elected as Mr. Forshaw’s proposal, here it is subdivided into several teams.

• On the one hand they are assigned 30% for their free work (they made it clear that it is free and they do not need any payment for it) of the previous months and another 10% for hardware maintenance (without us as a community knowing the expenses that this demands) to TR, that is a total of 40%;
• On the other hand Edward a 3%, just because he is Edward. Because, even if he has a declared grant program, that does not mean what he will do with the funds allocated to him. Otherwise we are talking about a donation for Edward’s grants.
• On the other hand, 10% to Zaradar, for the discretionary management of its development funds.
• 4% to Dunkan from the TR team (again another % for the TR team) for discretionary fund management (as you yourself mention) “for when the time comes” in your words, to have a new stablecoin or AFT as some mention. In other words, why not come up with a future proposal “for when the time comes” to allocate such funds. Why do it now with nothing concrete… These is a big question mark.
• And finally 1% for Forshaw for “seeker”.

According to this analysis if we add 40+3+10+4+1 we get a total of 59% of discretionary funds allocated. And that they will be used in a centralized manner. Because no one denies that among these people who are part of the group of 9 self-elected by Alex, due to the trust that exists between them, they can communicate with each other to establish jointly, the allocation and direction of such funds. Since from the community, there would be no way to verify the movements of the funds. That is a centralized system.

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In conclusion:

Most of this proposal, focuses only on allocating funds to teams that have not presented any real interest in it, presenting specific proposals in that regard. As mentioned above with TR, Dukan and Forshaw.

And on the other hand, funds are allocated, only by the name of who manages as Zaradar and Edward. Without requesting anything in return, no plan or detail regarding the destination of such funds.

So the parallel with Alex’s proposal is obvious. The same people and teams get 59% of the funds and their management at total discretion. These funds are totally centralized by people who were part of the previous team of 9 self-elected people that Alex proposed. And you say that the funds are not centralized? Not in the same way, but in fact they are.

I conclude this analysis, sharing with the community, how we normally proceed when the destination of funds is diffuse in relation to the parties involved. In judicial, business, institutional and political relations, a common term is used when the purpose of a project, proposal or regulation is not clear. Follow “the money trail”. This means, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the proposed actions or plans. Of all the donations, contributions or allocations that can be offered.

So, if we do this same analysis here, we will see that the ultimate beneficiaries are largely the same as before. When a centralized commission was simply proposed.

If we do the same thing with the proposal that Vegas is presenting, you will see that the ultimate beneficiary is the community itself and not a particular group of people or teams.

Draw your own conclusions. Now, I have nothing more to say.

Best regards. Good life to all