Distribute the $4M in Off-Chain Community Assets Towards LUNC’s Revitalization [v2]

[This is the v2 update for the original proposal found here: Distribute the $4M in Off-Chain Community Assets Towards LUNC’s Revitalization This updated version includes various tweaks, changes, and suggestions gathered from community feedback!]

PROPOSAL SUMMARY:

Shalom! :pray:

We, the signatories, propose to divide the approximately $4.1 million from the recently-unveiled ethereum crosschain multisig wallet [0x9538D438d506Fc426dB37fb83daC2a0752A02757] into manageable chunks with the specific intent of maximizing the money’s use across a wide array of initiatives. Ergo, this proposal seeks to outline a diverse set of undertakings that are greater than the sum of their parts, and will greatly speed up LUNC’s revitalization! Unlike other proposals of this type, this one seeks to send the money where it’s needed most, as soon as possible, with as much clarity as possible, and with the least amount of procrastination.

Our aim is to ensure that individuals and groups critical to LUNC’s betterment get access to funding sooner than later! The initiatives outlined in this proposal don’t lean on the good will of undoxxed individuals, nor hemorrhage funds to pay for unelected dignitaries - everything is done by the book and through regular governance channels!

Proposal Overview:

  1. Divide the overall assets available within the mult-sig wallet into smaller portions
  2. Hire a legal representative (or firm) to oversee this detailed process of extraction
  3. Ensure the money is clear of any legal liabilities, or prior entanglements/dependencies
  4. If necessary, nominate certain doxxed, trusted individual to act as temporary key-holders
  5. Once extracted, deliver the funds to specific beneficiaries as outlined in more detail below

DISCLAIMER & MOTIVATION:

With the recent passing of proposal #10879 (Ommunity assets distributed, by on-chain voting proposal), it’s become obvious that the community desires to exercise its voting rights. The $4.1 million in off-chain assets that’s recently come to everyone’s attention doesn’t belong to just a single handful of people, and must instead make its way through the trial of governance! The wider crypto space is rife with scams, exploitation, and lack of trust (as the recent FTX debacle proved all too painfully), which is exactly why we need to cling to proven methods. Ergo, any division of community money (such as that $4.1 million) must be done in a decentralized, trustless, and transparent manner! Our proposal aims to respect community sentiment that was expressed via the passing of prop #10879, and give the power of governance back to the people. With the steps outlined below we propose to divide the funds so they can serve as force multipliers in the greater theatre of LUNC’s rise from the ashes.

FUNDING BREAKDOWN & DETAILS:

[Reminder: The following asset distribution schema is percentile-based, meaning the actual amount of money found within the wallet is irrelevant to the overall disbursement plan outlined in the steps below!]

We take into account the wallet’s funds which stand at approximately $4.1 million ± X {adjusted for market volatility}, henceforth referred to as the “$4M” or “$4-million multi-sig wallet”. The method(s) and legal technicalities used to achieve extraction of these funds will be handled by an accredited intermediary hired explicitly for this purpose (more about this later in the proposal). With all the aforementioned in mind, we propose that the total assets (over $4M at current prices) be split thusly:

  • 30% - Purchase LUNC and send it to the community pool to fund future projects, dApps, initiatives, developers, marketing/outreach, etc., in accordance with community wishes. These assets will remain there for the foreseeable future once deposited, and will fall under community jurisdiction, to be spent in accordance with future governance proposals and their outcomes. These funds are not to be derailed, and are meant exclusively for the community pool!

  • 30% - Direct fiat payout to Terra Rebels, to be split among their members according to the group’s internal voting/agreement, in order to compensate them all for months of unpaid work. This portion of the funds can be temporarily frozen at the discretion of Terra Rebels until they’ve formed a DAO or some other legal entity to protect themselves from liability (if they so choose - we leave the decision to them). If this proposal passes, the funds can and should be paid out to Terra Rebels at their earliest convenience, in whichever manner they prefer (staggered payment, lump sum, etc.). If Terra Rebels internally votes to reject these funds (for whatever reason), then the money will be used to purchase LUNC and re-direct it into the community pool for the same purpose as above.

  • 15% - Fiat or crypto to be set aside for contract/bounty dev-work (programming), to attract and fund external developers who can lighten and speed up TR’s workload on LUNC (a la Jacob Gadikian’s recent coding work on IBCs). This fund would be under the direct control and supervision of Zaradar (Tobias Andersen), who would write and award “programming bounties” for needed blockchain work, and delegate them to external non-TR devs (with full transparency to the community, of course: ie, the work being done, the individual sub-contrated to do it, the agreed-upon price, the general time-frame for delivery, etc.). Every completed “bounty” would pay 85% of its award sum to the external programmer (cooperant), and 15% to Zaradar (to compensate him for the work-hours and effort needed to organize and run all this), regardless of the size of the contract…
    A few suggestions to ensure smooth operations:
    a) Each project should be completed before the agreed-upon payout can commence.
    b) Multiple diverse projects may be initiated at the same time, and/or run concurrently.
    c) Bounties can be paid in fiat or crypto (depending on agreement with cooperants).
    d) The price per bounty is set by Zaradar, depending on the nature/length/difficulty of the work!
    The contracted devs don’t need to be doxxed as long as they submit their work before being paid (and Zaradar approves it). Due to Zaradar’s technical aptitude and decades of programming & managerial experience, we leave to him full discretion whether to split this “bounty money” across many smaller projects, or use it to fund a handful of large ones. The purpose of this fund is to help TR progress through their LUNC roadmap faster, and hire outside help when needed (or for unforseen/external work that will benefit the chain). If Zaradar refuses to undertake this initiative (for whatever reason), then divert these funds to the community pool.

  • 10% - Fiat reserve to be placed aside under the jurisdiction of the Terra Rebels development & programming sub-team, for the explicit purpose of funding hardware/endpoints if TFL withdraws support and leaves LUNC out to dry. Given the legal troubles Mr. Do Kwon has found himself in, we should be prepared in case his company goes under and can’t (or won’t) provide further support for LUNC. The funds within this sub-section aim to address and pre-empt that possibility! The team in charge of these assets would reassess the need for this fund once every 6 months. Once it becomes superfluous, then divide the money into 2 parts: half for the community pool, and half as a payout for the Terra Rebels team stewarding it (if they refuse a payout, send their portion of the funds to the community pool). If the Terra Rebels development/programming sub-team refuses to undertake this task at all in case our proposal passes, then send these funds directly to the community pool.

  • 5% - Purchase LUNC and split it evenly between small LUNC validators who meet all of the 6 following criteria (for the purpose of further decentralizing voting power):
    (I) validator must have come online after 1st October 2022 as the second batch of active validators
    (II) validator must have been active prior to 15th of November 2022 (to prevent exploiting this drop)
    (III) validator must have less than or equal to 1% voting power at the time of this proposal passing
    (IV) validator must have at least 98% or more uptime, calculated at the time of this proposal passing
    (V) validator is not TC Core Dev (due to recent misleading actions and anti-community behavior)
    (VI) in case a validator runs/owns additional LUNC validators, only one of those will be eligible
    If no validators meet all of these requirements, then send the funds to the community pool!

  • 4% - Fiat or crypto collateral to be set aside for helping the eventual re-peg of LUNC’s potential stablecoin/AFT when the time comes (regardless if that’s USTC or something else entirely). This fund would be under the jurisdiction of Duncan Day from the Terra Rebels Quant Team, to be used for the express purpose outlined herein! Once a unified re-peg whitepaper has been produced by the Quant Team, these funds shall then be used to bootstrap the initiative at their discretion, and to the best of their ability. If the Quant Team refuses to custodian these funds in the meantime (or can’t agree upon a course of action within 6 months of this proposal passing), then divert the money into the community pool! Within those 6 months, however, the Quant Team is free to try and grow this fund by using 50% of it to acquire yield in whichever way they deem best (the other 50% must remain untouched, in case the first half is accidentally mismanaged). Duncan and the Quant Team retain the right to choose in which form these assets are held and grown (fiat, crypto, a combination of the two, etc.). Since Duncan is doxxed, he will be the primary quant in charge of spearheading and organizing this initiative, and will answer to the community about what’s currently being done with the funds at any point in time. The Quant Team must also publish a monthly report with the breakdown of their asset stewardship (expenses, yield, gains/losses, etc.), and release it to the community for the purpose of transparency and accountability! If Duncan refuses to undertake this task, RedlineDrifter may do so instead with all the aforementioned privileges and responsibilities, but he must doxx himself fully… If both refuse, send the funds to the community pool. If Alex Forshaw rejoins TR at any point in time as a Quant, these funds are to be immediately liquidated and used to purchase LUNC to be sent to the community pool!

  • 3% - Fiat payout to Professor Edward Kim’s grants program (http://terragrantsfoundation.org/), to further strengthen and aid the development of new utility for our growing chain. If Prof. Kim refuses to accept this money (for whatever reason), then re-divert the funds to the community pool.

  • 2% - Funds set aside for legal council to ensure the wallet holdings are clear of any legal liability (hire a professional to review and process the $4-million wallet extraction). This legally accredited and fully-doxxed individual (or multiple attorneys) would be paid via regular fiat, not crypto. We seek the most efficient way in which to process and obtain the approximate $4M outlined here in Mr. Forshaw’s article (Fund Devs With $4M of Off-Chain Community Assets). This must be done in a transparent manner that respects the law but seeks to minimize the amount of assets lost during the money’s inevitable transitory period (to regular taxes, crypto fees, slippage/swaps, etc.). Any remaining funds after this work has been completed and the legal advisor(s) paid in full (2% of overall wallet assets allotted for it) will be redirected to the community pool! If it becomes necessary, we nominate some of the Terra Rebels core founders to act as temporary multi-sig key holders for the express purpose of transferring the funds from the current key-owners to the community as outlined within this greater proposal. This “Tribunal” will consist of:
    (i)Tobias “Zaradar” Andersen
    (ii) Pedro “Vegas” Borges
    (iii) Professor Edward Kim
    If more than 1 of the aforementioned refuse to process this request (only 2/3 are needed!), then the accredited functionairy/councilor/attorney(s) will be tasked with doing so for the purpose of obtaining the assets from the current multi-sig custodians/key-holders… Note that these proposed keyholders would only act as a temporary “bridge” for the funds, and would have no spending freedom over the money (apart from any nominated and specific roles outlined elsewhere in this proposal).

  • 1% - Direct fiat payout to Mr. Alexander Forshaw as a “finder’s fee” for his work in pursuing these funds and negotiating their release from Mr. Do Kwon, but with the stipulation that Mr. Forshaw will not again involve himself in governance-making or proposal-writing for LUNC (he does remain free to voice his opinions as a private individual, and use his personal reserves of LUNC/USTC to vote on proposals as he sees fit). If this proposal passes but Mr. Forshaw refuses to accept the payout (for whatever reason), then split the money evenly among the Terra Rebels Discord moderator team to at least somewhat compensate all the unpaid work they do in building and coordinating the wider LUNC community. If some of them refuse, split the money between the remaining ones. If all of them refuse, send the funds to the community pool.

COMMUNITY SUGGESTIONS & FEEDBACK MANDATORY ADDENDA (1-5)

Addendum#1: Nominated Multi-Sig Keyholders’ Seigniorage/Rights/Powers and Limitations
By voting YES to this proposal, the voter agrees to empower the aforementioned nominees/Tribunal with the ability to handle the assets founds within the $4M multi-sig, with the intent of receiving and distributing them. This Tribunal can consist of up to 3/3 individuals, but as little as 2/3 will be enough to authorize payouts and move the assets as needed. The nominees are also forbidden form spending the money on anything else than disbursal to initiatives outlined in this proposal, with the exception of legal fees and/or payouts to screen and process the $4M multi-sig and its assets in case the Tribunal gains access to the wallet first.

Addendum#2: $4M Multi-Sig Wallet’s Assets Post-Extraction Governance/Voting Lockout Period
By voting YES to this proposal, the voter agrees that if this current proposal passes, then no other one may lay claim over – or be presented with the intent to! – influence the disbursement of these funds for at least 3 months from the day of this proposal passing! The aim of this addendum is to avoid the assets being trapped in “governance hell” and entangled in multiple other proposals while the money is being paid out according to this one (since some of those assets may need to be sent out in staggered settlements).

Addendum#3: Indemnification Clause for Asset Beneficiaries and Tribunal Nominees
By voting YES to this proposal, the voter agrees to indemnify all the individuals and groups mentioned in this proposal, to whom care is being entrusted of community funds. This does not absolve the beneficiaries and nominees of responsibility, as they’re still beholden to the community to act in a fair and transparent manner, but it should help shield them from legal liability in case of external complications like unforeseen market volatility or acts of G-d. This addendum is necessary, otherwise certain potential beneficiaries (ex: Quant Team) wouldn’t be able to handle the money without fear of legal liability.

Addendum#4: Multi-Sig Assets Screening, Processing, Extraction, and Community Report
By voting YES to this proposal, the voter agrees to empower Terra Rebels with the ability to choose legal council (ex: one or more councilors, attorneys, or a law firm), who will screen the multi-sig for signs of financial contamination and legal liability while also outlining the most efficient way with which to extract those assets (with the aim of minimizing losses to taxes, fees, swaps, etc.). Once the multi-sig funds have been pronounced clear of contamination, they can be further divided as outlined in this proposal. A full report will be published for the benefit of the community, outlining the exact nature and amount of assets found within the multi-sig, as well as all accompanying fees (legal or otherwise) paid to screen and extract those funds!

Addendum#5: Four-Week Asset-Distribution Grace Period and Post-Extraction Fund Stewardship
By voting YES to this proposal, the voter agrees to the following: any money which isn’t claimed by its nominee(s) or the community pool within 1 month of the $4M wallet being fully processed (for whatever reason), is to be deposited in a publicly-viewable bank account under the auspices/stewardship of the legal firm doing the extraction, and is to remain there until the earliest opportunity it can be sent to its specified destination! This should (hopefully) eliminate any cases of assets being “stuck in limbo” and acting as a burden on the Tribunal key-holders while the community waits for beneficiaries to process the funds allocated to them (or in case of their refusal, the re-diverting of said funds into the community pool). In an ideal scenario, this addendum won’t be needed at all (as the money will be quickly and efficiently divided after being screened and extracted from the wallet), but this clause is here for the sake of thoroughness.

Q&A SECTION (JUSTIFICATION + CLARIFICATION)

Q: Why not simply buy and burn $4 million worth of LUNC? Wouldn’t that demonstrate the community’s willingness to sacrifice for the greater good, while also driving the price up?
A: It’d be a token gesture, nothing more. There’s almost 7 trillion coins out there - burning about 20 billion ($4-million worth) won’t cause even a dent in the overall supply! It’s wasteful. Not to mention that so much money can be used to fund actual development and utility for the chain, which will serve us in perpetuity and not just for one single burn. And any positive price action would be short-lived in this kind of bear market.

Q: Why throw so much money into the community pool? No one even uses that!
A: There’ll come a time in the future when multiple developers and groups will compete to build on our blockchain. We’re not there yet, but it will happen. The money in the community pool can be used as a carrot. There’s still a lot of work that needs to be done to restore LUNC’s functionality and bring it to parity with LUNA2 (so the latter’s dApps can be backported). Once a few key components like that have been restored is when we’ll begin seeing a lot of interest - having money in the community pool will give us options.

Q: Does Terra Rebels deserve to be paid so much? They’re volunteers, aren’t they?
A: Yes, they deserve to paid because they’ve been working for months, for free, and they’re the main reason we have any positive price movement on LUNC. There’s over 40 people on that team - once the money is divided, it’s not even that much per person. Also, without them the chain would’ve died a long time ago, and everyone holding LUNC would have worthless tokens right now. If or when some other competing group comes along that’s willing to work on LUNC, then we can re-open this discussion, but for the time being TR is our main driver of progress… and we’re lucky to have them! Regardless of all that, people deserve to be paid for their honest work. And the more money we can secure for TR, the faster they can work on developing LUNC for us!

Q: Why does this proposal aim to play favorites with some validators while ignoring others?
A: We desperately need more decentralization. Voting power is mostly concentrated among the top handful of validators… and there isn’t enough money in that $4M wallet to change this to any large degree. Sending some LUNC to the lower-power/new(er) validators will help to at least somewhat offset the major gap that’s been present for so long, and that allows a handful of people to hold so much influence. It can also be done with relatively few funds diverted to this cause. Also, we’re not playing favorites here - any validator who fits the criteria is eligible to get LUNC if the proposal passes. And by the time this proposal goes up for voting (and/or passes) the validator landscape could look much different than now, so there’s no way to tell who’ll be eligible for those tokens.

Q: How exactly are these “programming bounties” supposed to help us? And why Zaradar?
A: Terra Rebels are underpaid and overworked - most of them have to hold down regular 9-5 jobs, and can’t dedicate an entire workday to LUNC. This is where the bounties come in! Tobias Andersen (Zaradar) is one of the most respected and knowledgeable individuals within the community, and he’s also a senior developer/programmer with extensive experience in managing large projects. By writing and offering these “bounties” to external programmers, Zaradar would be able to relieve some of the devwork pressure he and his team are under. He’s also fully doxxed and has demonstrated his committment to LUNC by working on the project for months without pay. There’s no better person to run this initiative (Prof. Ed Kim was briefly considered as a co-lead, but he’s already occupied with his grants program).

Q: This proposal makes a point about decentralization, but then goes and nominates 3 keyholders to handle all our money? Isn’t that literally the definition of centralization?
A: Those 3 keyholders wouldn’t have any personal control or spending power over the $4 million - their only role would be to temporarily handle the multisig until the off-chain assets within can be divided as outlined in this proposal. Ideally, this would be done in as short a timeframe as possible. The nominated keyholders (Tobias Andersen, Edward Kim, Pedro Borges) were hand-picked for their outstanding track record and community contributions. All 3 are doxxed, trusted, and upstanding members of our community. There were some other fine members who were also considered, but they weren’t doxxed so they didn’t make the list.

Q: Why only 2/3 on the multi-sig wallet? Why not 3/3 - wouldn’t that be a ‘safer’ option?
A: No, because life is unpredictable and we need to hedge our bets. Hopefully all the multisig nominees remain in good health, but it’s best not to take chances when $4M of community funds are on the line. The 2/3 if a good compromise that ensures we can still extract the money from the wallet in case one of the three nominated key-holders becomes indisposed (for whatever reason) and can’t participate, or decides not to obey the guidelines set within this proposal. This change came via a suggestion from the community, and after giving it careful consideration, we (the signatories) concluded it’s best to enforce 2/3 instead of 3/3.

Q: Why is Mr. Forshaw discouraged from governance-making if he accepts the “finder’s fee”?
A: Because of his rather questionable behavior in the past, and conflicts-of-interest in the present.

CLOSING REMARKS

It is our wish to see LUNC prosper, and those working on its revitalization paid for their efforts. For this to happen, the community needs to put aside its tribalistic differences and finally come together in a way that allows the assets within that $4M wallet to be spent on further developing the chain itself. Only by working together can we ensure a prosperous future for LUNC, and for everyone who believes in its potential.

Vote YES if you AGREE with everything outlined above, and how the funds should be distributed!
Vote NO if you DISAGREE with some or most of the above, and how the funds should be distributed.

Proposal penned and submitted by:
Rabbi Jebediah Aaron-David Shekelstein,
Grand Mohel & President of Israel’s Septuagenarian Crypto-Enthusiasts Club

Co-signers:
Prof. Levi Goldmann
Dr. Menacheim Rubin
Mohel Shlomo Saban
Yosef “Uli” Bizraeli
Baruch Kvetcher Sr.
Moses K. Morgenthau
Zachariah J. Cohen
Benjamin Garrison
Abraham Schnözler
Ariel David Blum
Forchin Polowitz
Omar Lichtenberg
Kazarya N’Meelkers
Sarah-Ruth Ann Levi

9 Likes

Great improvements to the first proposal! This should really accelerate LUNC development.

4 Likes

Transfer assets to community pool. And any next transfers/spend by passed proposal. What’s wrong?

Wow. You made corrections based on the feedback you received by the entire community. Thanks, Rabbi. NGL I wish more members of the community were open to criticism and capable of adapting based on honest feedback.

8 Likes

Rabbi I remember when you first began with the community proud to see how far you came this prop is money :money_with_wings:

5 Likes

This is a very nice revision. Most of the holes have been patched up and it seems to my eyes fairly airtight. Shouldn’t run into legal issues if handled this way. Hope this passes soon: we really need to make use of these funds asap!

5 Likes

Good job Mr Rabbi, I like When you take in mind any positive or negative feedback, when you listen to the community and do what’s needed. So I support you.
We truly need to move forward and ignore bad actors playing both sides and people trying to stop #LUNCCommunity progress.

God job Sir

5 Likes

Rabbi listened all the feedback and improved an already perfect proposal. The proposal takes care of everyone, our devs will get paid, and even the discord mods will get a piece of cake if mister Alex doesn’t want his part!
.
Rabbi cares for my bag, so I will vote YES.

6 Likes

Nothing is ever perfect but it’s nice when someone can take suggestions from the community and implement changes to a proposal without being an immovable object. I vote yes (:

3 Likes

All in all, this is a sound proposal, it shows depth and transparency and most importantly stands by the community and provides Terra Rebels compensation for all their time put into this project and community,
I truly believe that Rabbi has his best interests at heart for LUNC and the community.

thank you Rabbi, Mazel Tov!

3 Likes

Shalom, Rabbi. I appreciate your work on this. Seeing some reasonable discussion is a breath of fresh air.

Only skimmed, but two things come to mind:

  1. Is it really a good idea to include an open bribe to validators within the proposal? This is a clear conflict of interest and sets a bad precedent.

  2. The “finders’ fee” for Alex is ridiculous. The funds were visibly out in the open. The first person to message Do Kwon about it doesn’t deserve $40,000; the money was always there. Moreover, Alex has proven himself to be a rent seeker looking to extract as much as possible from the community, even at its detriment, for his own personal gain. I see the value in paying him to go away, but I firmly believe that terrorists should not be negotiated with. Remove this clause; he deserves exactly zero.

All the best with this proposal, it looks pretty robust.

4 Likes

Thanks for leaving a commment, I’ll try and answer your questions to the best of my ability.

I don’t think it’s as much a bribe as it’s an attempt by us as a community to even the scales a bit. The top handful of validators hold too much power, they can sway proposals with a vote. Nothing against them personally, they’re just trying to run a business - but it’s not conducive to healthy governance. This is an attempt to even the scales a bit, if only a little (there’s not enough money in that entire wallet to offset the current imbalance to any noticeable degree).

Funny you should mention that 1%, because I’ve gotten messages and read hateful replies DEMANDING he be given a lot more than that. The main reasoning behind the “finder’s fee” payout isn’t to exclude Alex as a person or contributor to LUNC’s governance (no one can stop him from writing new proposals and articles under a pseudonym), but rather to dismantle his platform which he uses to relentlessly attack not just LUNC but the wider community and Terra Rebels. The idea is to pay him for some of the good work he’s done in the past during his tenure at TR, and send him on his merry way.

Shalom! :pray:

4 Likes

Good.On terra station with it!

1 Like

This proposal will take us to the moon. Dont listen to Alex and his cronies fudding and whining

2 Likes

Convert the ETH to Lunc and burn it all resulting in the market cap being divided into less units making each Lunc worth more and signaling to the crypto~space that we are serious about fixing Lunc.

We have a healthy community pool (that’s growing well) to fund development. Once we dev the core, third parties will be attracted to it and build around it at their expense. Our pool can fund that core dev (with the appropriate circuit breakers to prevent supply malfunctions), we just need the right coder(s). Coders who hold Lunc know their Lunc will increase in value once that core is fixed and the supply is burned down ~ just need those coders to step up and dev that core right.

Burning that money is wasteful, you won’t make a dent in the supply or price.

Funding initiatives and development is a more sensible approach.

Shalom! :pray:

7 Likes

I appreciate the in depth proposal but simply put, the assets should all be used to either buy back and burn or be sent directly to the oracle pool. Anything else creates conflicts of interest and opens receivers up to legal issues

1 Like

Burning the total supply down will cause a lesser divide in the market cap ~ increasing the value of each Lunc ~ it’s not waste.

@Exoneratelarouche ~ who is ‘us’ ~ those getting a piece of the 4.1million$??? Seriously…

1 Like

Hi Alex

2 Likes