We’re proposing to re-activate staking on Luna Classic after the snapshot on may 27th so a decentralized community who wishes to stay on Luna classic can take part on governance as it should be in a decentralized POS project.
Since LFG ,Do Kwon and Co will focus on the new Luna we want to focus on Luna Classic with people who wishes to participate on that project hence we also would like to get the possibility to vote for our own validators/deligators and take part on Luna Classic DPOS governance
Do you believe that the reason why staking was disabled (a possibility of an attack due to extremely low price and huge supply of LUNA) is now not relevant? That would imply that such an attack does not make sense, e.g. because the value in native and non-native assets to be exploited is less than the price of such attack. Do you have any data to confirm that this is the case?
What do you mean by attack? If someone owns sufficient LUNA to have the impact you describe, in a truly decentralized system, their votes carry the most weight. If people do not like that they should buy more governance tokens in the market (plenty available!!) in order to challenge that vote.
The only governance attack risk is the one that already happened - the disabling of delegations by TFL/v2 aligned validators so that only 0.01% of circulating LUNA (those that they control) could vote. This single act realized the very risk that you are talking about, in such a way that it could never be challenged. Hence the v2 proposal vote and all other ongoing votes are rigged.
I don’t agree with this proposal, at least as of now.
Reasons:
No clear documentation. We need a new whitepaper before we start doing anything else.
The hyper-inflation of $LUNC has lead to a quite disturbance in the number of coins held by someone. Initial validators are left with pre-inflated small number of LUNC, while people who got it cheap has billions of them. This has to be addressed somehow. I don’t know exactly how, but it should be done.
The UST mechanism should be improved before staking. Due to hyper-inflation, the faulty UST-LUNC peg problem will only increase and the chain will be much more vulnerable than it was before. The improved algorithm should be mentioned in the whitepaper.
We need institutional support. What is the use of chain on which no-one wants to build upon. The institutions has to be convinced and then, the system will grow.
You can’t get 20% returns. That was a non-sense. Anchor was phoney-like (refer: duck test). Anchor algorithm either needs to be changed, or it has to be completely revamped.
Hi @Abbas_Baldiwala , I see your points but not sure to understand them:
Why do you need updated documentation to go back to a previous functioning state ?
People will stack their lunc to the validators of their choices. The fact that you have a (way) larger number of lunc does not impact the staking / voting system to my knowledge. We just need more lunc to be staked
This is independent from the decision to allow staking. I agree with you that the mint/burn mechanism should not be activated at this point, and this should be a decision to be made with a vote… enabled by reactivating staking in the first place
Why would we need institutional support ? As part of the trillions minted, maybe some institutions bought the majority of the tokens, maybe not. Hard to know at this stage. We need staking in place to see if some groups have a majority in governance
This is clearly a different issue than staking. Anchor has nothing to do with staking. Staking rate should have been pretty high if ustc kept the peg, but as of today rewards are most likely going to be quite small if we convert back to usd
Their might be a security risk to reopen staking, but I fail to see which one. I would be interested to know more about that
Hello @Paul_Leprecheur , I understand your doubts regarding my comment. I agree on a lot of point with you, but I will try to answer some of my concerns.
You need updated documentation, because the previously functioning state and current state are not same. The initial documentation focused mostly on maintaining the UST pegged to dollar. We are not maintaining the peg as of now, so the stakers should get an updated idea regarding the functionality of new system.
The doubt is not regarding the hyper-inflation of coins and it’s impact on stacking or voting. The problem is, iniial validators and builders don’t have the same number of coins as someone who has bought it after hyper-inflation. So, even if they want to contribute, they can’t and they won’t have any significant say in the new voting. Eg: I had 10,000 LUNA before depeg, now, the same 10,000 LUNA is worthless percentage wise. So, the only way to be apart of the voting system would be to buy LUNA now and stake. I hope you understand the prtoblem. We need the support of pre-depeg validators and builders.
so yeah, we can start staking but point no.2 remains.
Institutions bring money, and for a lot of eco-system to take off, financial and/or advisorial support may be required. Again, I am not 100% convinced on my statement, so you are correct here too.
yes understood, but many people blame anchor and it’s high yield for the entire fiasco, so for gaining confidence that may be required. Again, I do understand it is not important for staking.
The risk to reopening staking is, malicious entities may have a large number of LUNA (considering the low MCap, which may lead to a biased or malicious results in the eco-system.
First of all the old luna members created the inflation themself.It was not an attack of new luna buyers.Secondly luna is a DPOS.The old luna people who lost majority get their new BIG stake at the new luna and want at the same time control the old luna where they have nearly no coins.
That is hypocracy.
Thirdly if someone bought a lot of luna it means he wants to make money so he surly won’t hurt luna but want to push focus on luna classic instead of the new luna.
Luna Classic is not Luna and we focus on our chain and not on Luna with Do as leader.
We do not accept Do as leader.
Validatrs have their new chain.They ignored 95% of communities opinon so they fear to get removed even i can say many old validators who were keen to community still have communities support.
UST is a debt of LFG.Luna Classic may if community wishes to recomensate but has no duty.
Old Luna community who had a duty created a new chain and gave special conditions to UST holders.
You demand institutional support.Do and his validators are moving everything to its new chain.Without gaining control over Luna Classic by the community noone will come to LC because everyone will be redirected to the new chain.
You need updated documentation, because the previously functioning state and current state are not same. The initial documentation focused mostly on maintaining the UST pegged to dollar. We are not maintaining the peg as of now, so the stakers should get an updated idea regarding the functionality of new system.
1RE
Since we can’t vote there can’t be any new documentations which would be valid.
Only documentation which are currently possible would be from Do and Co who’s main focus is on new chain
The doubt is not regarding the hyper-inflation of coins and it’s impact on stacking or voting. The problem is, iniial validators and builders don’t have the same number of coins as someone who has bought it after hyper-inflation. So, even if they want to contribute, they can’t and they won’t have any significant say in the new voting. Eg: I had 10,000 LUNA before depeg, now, the same 10,000 LUNA is worthless percentage wise. So, the only way to be apart of the voting system would be to buy LUNA now and stake. I hope you understand the prtoblem. We need the support of pre-depeg validators and builders.
2RE
validators and builders don’t need any significant amount.They need it to stay in power and control and nothing else.
Good devs can get incentive from community pool.Validators make their new coins from validating blocks.They are not the decission makers but a service provider…The Community holds the power.Learn DPOS
3.so yeah, we can start staking but point no.2 remains.
3RE and ?Everyone had the same chance.It was them who inflated the coins and not the owners of a bigger amount.Anyone had and still have a chance to buy cheap coins.
Just because they owned a majority before doesn’t mean they have now in a DPOS control for lifetime
Institutions bring money, and for a lot of eco-system to take off, financial and/or advisorial support may be required. Again, I am not 100% convinced on my statement, so you are correct here too.
4RE Institutions don’t invest in a blockchain which is controlled by a group which favorise another chain and which controls the chain they don’t work on.
5 yes understood, but many people blame anchor and it’s high yield for the entire fiasco, so for gaining confidence that may be required. Again, I do understand it is not important for staking.
5RE To change this it needs regular voting by community to create changes.No Community voting no Changes
The risk to reopening staking is, malicious entities may have a large number of LUNA (considering the low MCap, which may lead to a biased or malicious results in the eco-system.
Your logic is simple stupid and a stupid excuse from Do Kwon to keep control on that chain even he doesnt work on it anymore.
Nobody would be so stupid to invest to destroy his own investment.
The only one who could destroy is someone who has no investment in that chain anymore.
Also what exectly do you want to destroy when majority of devs and groups said to support new Terra Luna 2.0 ?
The Dev’s who were behind community will leave anyways if this chain will stay under Do’s and his peoples control
Btw the whitelisting request was over a day ago and still no whitelisting
I would like to respond to three interrelated issues here.
Governance: Although some may not like it, at least here in the U.S., the SEC sees governance coins as a security based upon these laws. That means you have a stake in governance when you own LUNA. The governance documents (here and here) never state any separation in classes of ownership, therefore all LUNA owners are equal, based upon how much LUNA they own (again similar to stock). You can call LUNA what you like personally (if you want), but you need to know, if you are subject to U.S. jurisdiction, they will see it as a security.
Some may try to wiggle out of this by saying that there is no legal structure to a DAO. Legally, even a non-person association, which use a trustee (who conducts businesses in the their own name on behalf of the association), can still be considered a legal entity (even if it is on the basis of a verbal contract). While there may be other legal arrangements for this community, one legal document states that this is a non-personhood community trust with trustees and an enforcer (which interestingly enough are not TerraForm Labs). Although this was done as part of a sports deal, it in turn legally outlined the community, and specified a trust where the governance community is the legal owner of certain intellectual property rights (this is apart from any other organizations that may support the governance community, or work on its behalf).
Proof of Stake: Just like a company can issue stock, and the majority stock holders have the majority say (although all stock holders of specific ownership classes have some say in governance of the corporation), the only thing that is stated in the governance documents are that LUNA coins need to be staked in order to vote on proposals. It is assumed in the governance documents, in the links above, that staking would always be open to a person who owns LUNA for voting purposes. The whole idea of Proof of Stake is that the larger the stake, the more you have invested into the community, and the more you will protect it (rather than sabotage it). It makes no difference if LUNA was $100 or $0.0002 - either way a person with a lot of money could buy majority portions of LUNA (the buying power / dollar value of LUNA is irrelevant since it applies equally to all people). If others feel their stake is threatened, they can certainly purchase more (LUNA [LUNC] is still available on some exchanges, and has been since the collapse in price). The threat that someone may take over actually incentivizes both coalitions in regards to stake, as well as further purchases of the security (ie. LUNA [LUNC]). The whole idea of proof-of-stake attack sounded good, and maybe for a day or two I can see giving the community time to respond, but in reality, it actually posed no further threat than it did when LUNA was at $100 (the same threats in proof-of-stake could easily be just as exploited there as it can when the price moves down or up).
Governance attack: This sounded good, and maybe for a few days could have been supported in terms of proof-of-stake surrounding the issue of governance while coalitions formed around stake in the community, and people were able to defend their stakes by purchasing more LUNA, but the real attack was:
shutting off the staking that shut people who were not staked out of voting without providing another mechanism,
doing it without a proposal that had passed by community vote,
doing it days before a proposal and vote on major direction of the community,
of having the LUNA Foundation Guard spend close to $1B to purchase LUNA for staking purposes (for the purpose of attempting to prevent a proof-of-stake attack),
implementing a whitelisting feature, without community vote, hours before the official TerraForm Labs proposal 1623 was posted, and without clear communication or any real procedure for whitelisting. The comments that surrounded the discussion of whitelisting within the development community in my estimation showed that proposals were not necessarily being blocked solely due to “spam,” but some were blocked due to viewpoint (whether that was the personal choice of the reviewer, or from others in leadership in TerraForm Labs, I do not know).
To be fair, they did eventually publish the whitelist procedure. I found one of their support to be helpful. I found that one developer commented to a verbal struggle that was happening around proposal 1273 say “this really sucks. Democracy is really a joke.”, and only after that comment was 1273 finally whitelisted (after it has specifically been denied by a previous TerraForm Labs developer as “intentional”). In one situation, surrounding proposal 1385, what one TerraForm Labs developer said, which sounded good at the time, was actually a little disingenuous on further investigation - thankfully a community developer frustratingly commented and pointed out the “bad faith”). TerraForm Labs did put a slider bar that allowed both the desktop and web wallets to finally see all proposals again (thankfully), although at that point proposal 1623 was only a few days away from closing, and it still gave a handful of proposals a clear visual advantage. In addition, the whitelisting procedure (which thankfully they eventually published) is less than intuitive for those who are not in the application development field (or at least are familiar with repositories such as git).
The whitelisting feature blocked certain proposals from being voted on in the desktop wallet, and gave an advantage to those proposals that were whitelisted [disclosure, proposal 1597, which I worked on, was whitelisted for the last few days before voting ended on that proposal].
The governance documents specifically document that a person is suppose to go to Terra Station > Governance > and Voting to vote on a proposal (not have to use a direct link, and a whitelisting feature that basically hid legitimate proposals).
I realize that the staff and support at TerraForm Labs have been very busy lately. However, whether it was intended or not, it is difficult at this point, to not recognize that these items above worked together to give an unfair and inappropriate advantage to the TerraForm Labs proposal, and worked to bypassed the community to maintain control in such a way that is legally inappropriate in a legal governance environment (even if that is not what they were intending). While I have tried to both be honest, while not disparaging the work of TerraForm Labs, I find myself being much more sympathetic, than I was at the start of this process, to those who have outright stated that the process that has shut off those who hold LUNA from participating in the voting process (whether pre-crash holders not staked, or post-crash holders not staked), and provided clear advantages to the TerraForm Labs proposal (and a handful of others that made it through the whitelisting process while other legitimate proposals did not), is the real governance attack.
I can understand from a business perspective that every leadership regime, and sometimes even those among the stockholders, would rather not see change - however, if they were willing to open the process to public funding, and building a community that would be tasked with broad governance, then they need to honor that process with integrity (even if they still attempt to protect their position). If that was not what they were intending, then they should have remained a private company.
Staking at this point should resume for the LUNC chain. I can see no legitimate reason for staking to remain suspended if this truly is a governance community.
